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Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global 
Intellectual Property Regime 
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG 
Since the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994, the innovative landscape has undergone 
dramatic changes due to technological advances in fields such as biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, and digital communications and computation.  The increasing 
potential for user innovation, and open and collaborative innovation has brought 
an explosion of innovative activity that does not fit into the sales-oriented, mass 
market model which underlies the global intellectual property regime. In this 
Article, I argue that the debate over global governance of innovation should be 
expanded to account more fully for the implications of these changes.  For the 
most part, criticisms of TRIPS have focused on its failure to account adequately 
for current needs for access to the fruits of innovative activity.  In particular, 
critics have focused on the agreement's failure to balance urgent public health 
needs appropriately against the marginal boost to pharmaceutical innovation 
supplied by patent protection in developing countries.  Here I take a different 
(though complementary) tack, focusing on the ways in which TRIPS and related 
agreements enshrine an unduly narrow approach to innovation itself.  An 
adequate global governance system for innovation must take account of the 
diversity and dynamism of modes of innovation.  I propose a re-imagining of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization as a broader-based innovation policy 
organization and a global administrative law approach to accommodate evolving 
modes of innovation. 
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Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global 
Intellectual Property Regime 
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994,1 the innovative landscape has 
undergone dramatic changes due to technological advances in fields such 
as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and digital communications and 
computation.  Notably, the negotiation of TRIPS coincided almost exactly 
with the rise in importance of the Internet following the invention of the 
World Wide Web and the introduction of the Mosaic web browser in the 
early 1990s.2  These technological changes have spawned major social 
changes, which are increasingly felt throughout the world.  The resulting 
changes in the innovative landscape, especially as instantiated in the 
complex technologies of the information technology industry, have given 
rise to controversy about the proper contours of intellectual property (IP) 
protection and to upheaval in the political economy of IP lawmaking.  This 
upheaval is reflected in the split between the pharmaceutical sector and 
many information technology companies in their positions on patent 
reform in the United States.3 
Since 1994, there has been explosive growth in user innovation4 and 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, DePaul University.  I thank Steve Charnovitz, Margaret Chon, Kevin Davis, 
Graeme Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Ruth Okediji, participants at the NYU-Cape Town Global 
Administrative Law Workshop, 2008 IP Scholars Conference, faculty workshops at George 
Washington University, University of Minnesota, and Fordham University for invaluable comments 
and Hima Lawrence for excellent research assistance.  A brief report of some of this work will appear 
in Acta Juridica (2008) as part of the proceedings of the NYU-Cape Town Global Administrative Law 
Workshop.  This Article was written in part while the Author was visiting at New York University 
School of Law in 2007-08. 
1 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: 
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 27 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the adoption and implementation of 
the agreement). 
2 See, e.g., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., AMERICA’S INVESTMENT IN THE FUTURE 13 (2000), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/nsf0050/internet/mosaic.htm. 
3 See Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 322 (2005) (discussing the disagreement between the pharmaceutical sector 
and information technology companies regarding the Patent Reform Act of 2005). 
4 For an overview of user innovation, see ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1–3 
(2006). 
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innovation resulting from open and collaborative processes.5  These 
innovation paradigms do not fit into the sales-oriented, mass market model 
underlying IP doctrine.  While these innovative paradigms are not new, the 
ascendance of industrial research and development and of mass production 
had pushed them to the margins.  Technological advances, particularly in 
digital communications, have revitalized these contexts for innovation in 
surprising ways.   
There has been considerable scholarly and public debate about the 
impact of the TRIPS minimum standards approach to patent law on access 
to patented technology, particularly in the public-health-related fields of 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture.6  Indeed that debate has led to 
modifications of the TRIPS agreement, as reflected in the Doha 
Declarations,7 and to the adoption of a Development Agenda by the World 
IP Organization (WIPO).8  Critics have also argued that the overly 
cramped interpretations of TRIPS exceptions evident in the handful of 
relevant World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution decisions 
distort the balance between initial and follow-on innovation under a mass 
market seller-based innovation regime.9  There has been considerably less 
discussion, however, about the interplay between the global IP regime and 
                                                                                                                          
5 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1–2 (2006) (discussing the economic importance of open and collaborative 
innovation). 
6 See generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2821 (2006); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004); Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of 
Play, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 505 (2005); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 369 (2006); see also Thomas W. Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research 
Program, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 182 (2005) (discussing the impact of TRIPS on biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals); Symposium, Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Accommodating and 
Reconciling Different National Levels of Protection, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109 (2007) (collecting 
articles discussing the impact of intellectual property agreements on public health and agriculture); 
Symposium, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture, 11 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 239 (2003) (collecting articles discussing the impacts of intellectual property 
agreements on indigenous cultures, plants, and medicines). 
7 See World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, 
41 I.L.M. 746, 748–49 (2002); World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial 2001: Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Nov. 14, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 755, 755–56 (2002). 
8 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE 45 ADOPTED RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER THE WIPO 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2007) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT AGENDA], available at http://www.wipo. 
int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf . 
9 For a discussion of recommended interpretations, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science 
Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER 
GLOBALIZED IP REGIME (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in 
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW (Lucie 
Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without 
Discriminating]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 95 (2004). 
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the revitalized practices of user innovation and open and collaborative 
innovation.10 
In this Article, I argue that, over and above previously appreciated 
problems regarding access and the traditional IP balance, the trouble with 
TRIPS—and with the global IP law regime more generally—is that it is ill-
designed to cope with changes in the innovative process itself and with the 
likely heterogeneity of desirable innovation approaches in different global 
contexts.  While current TRIPS flexibilities might be interpreted in ways 
that will better balance the needs of initial innovators against those of users 
and follow-on innovators, the very structure of the agreement is based on 
an assumption of mass market, seller-based innovation which may make it 
difficult to accommodate newer innovation paradigms. 
Because the processes by which innovation occurs are various and 
changing, it is important, but not sufficient, to focus on making substantive 
improvements to TRIPS and its interpretations so as to deal with current 
issues involving such things as access to medicines or agricultural 
technologies and the increasing importance of information technology with 
its predominance of cumulative innovation.  The experience of the past 
fifteen years should serve as a cautionary tale regarding the wisdom of 
enshrining substantive rules based on any particular paradigm of 
innovation in an inflexible international instrument.  Thus, along with 
seeking solutions to the particular problems confronting today’s innovators 
in dealing with the outmoded TRIPS framework, it would be wise to 
consider how to implement an ongoing process at the global level for 
navigating the tension between the truly global reach of innovation and the 
heterogeneous and changing social practice of innovation.  The complexity 
of the innovative environment, in combination with the need for both 
flexibility and consistency, suggests that we consider an administrative-
type approach which builds in an expectation of the need for substantive 
updating of the global innovation policy governance regime, rather than an 
attempt to lock in substantive standards tailored to today’s innovation 
environment.11 
                                                                                                                          
10 But see Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual Property Organization and 
the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Council in Regulating Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Information Age, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 578, 578, 585 (1999) (discussing the need 
for global IP regulation to account for unfolding technological change). 
11 For general discussions of the varieties of and issues raised by “agency-like” actors at the 
global level, see generally Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005); 
Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State]; 
Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 109 (2005) [hereinafter Cassese, Global Standards]; Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the 
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Benedict Kingsbury 
et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005); Anne-
Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. SOC. 
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To that end, I propose a re-envisioning of WIPO as a more broadly 
conceived innovation policy organization, which would serve as a center of 
discourse not only about how IP law per se should be adapted to changing 
modes of innovation but also about how to confront new dilemmas raised 
by evolving innovative practices, which may involve issues beyond IP law, 
such as competition policy, licensing practices, and the tradeoff between 
private ordering and the public domain.12  WIPO has historically focused 
on promoting the IP regime13 and has been rightly criticized for pursuing 
the stronger IP rights myopically.14 (Indeed, WIPO has manifested some 
hostility toward the poster child for open and collaborative innovation: 
open source software).15  Nonetheless, I argue—building on a related 
argument by Rochelle Dreyfuss16—that WIPO is the most promising home 
for a broader focus on innovation policy in light of its expertise, its 
experience with the Development Agenda, and its relationship with the 
WTO under TRIPS.  Indeed, there are encouraging signs in this regard in 
                                                                                                                          
SCI. 211 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative 
Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005). 
12 For general discussions regarding the challenges to the balance between IP and the public 
domain raised by private ordering, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property 
System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 
(Daniel S. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, The International IP System: Treaties, Norms, 
National Courts, and Private Ordering]; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of 
International Copyright Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 161, 162 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Private Ordering], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=604161; Séverine Dusollier Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through 
Private Ordering, 82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1391 (2007); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: 
The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005); 
Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
25 (2000); Arti K. Rai, “Open Source” and Private Ordering: A Commentary on Dusollier, 82 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1439 (2007).  
13 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
1749, 1772 (“The objectives of the Organization are: (i) to promote the protection of intellectual 
property throughout the world through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in 
collaboration with any other international organization, (ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among 
the Unions.”).  See generally Debora J. Halbert, The World Intellectual Property Organization: Past, 
Present and Future, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 253 (2006), for a discussion of the history of 
WIPO and its goals, along with a critique of WIPO governance and a proposal that it take on a broader, 
more participatory role in the development context. 
14 See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual 
Property Norms, 39 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK INT’L L. (forthcoming 2008), draft at 37 (“In sum, 
WIPO’s institutional transformation and the strategies by which that transformation was effected . . . 
were central in entrenching the contemporary prevailing IP orthodoxy in which public policy concerns 
can limit the exclusive proprietary rights of rights owner only in exceptional circumstances.”) 
15 See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, The Quiet War Over Open-Source, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003 at 
E01, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (describing WIPO capitulation to pressure to 
cancel a meeting to discuss open source software). 
16 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Fostering Dynamic Innovation and Development: International IP as a 
Case Study in Global Administrative Law, ACTA JURIDICA (forthcoming 2008), available at 
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2008.4Dreyfuss.pdf.  For a similar argument with respect to 
development issues, see also Halbert, supra note 13, at 283–84. 
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recent WIPO recognition of the impingement of broader innovation policy 
issues on the patent system.17  The thrust of this Article is to encourage a 
more central place for considerations of the full panoply of innovation 
paradigms in the development of patent policy and of IP more generally. 
A broader mandate for WIPO could be implemented in several ways, 
with varying levels of administrative discretion vested in the re-imagined 
organization.18  As a first cut, WIPO might develop an Innovation Policy 
Agenda incorporating the concerns of innovative communities of various 
types, including commercial firms, user innovator communities, scientific 
researchers, and open source proponents, along with the concerns of other  
stakeholders such as developing and developed countries and NGOs 
representing users.  An Innovation Policy Agenda would be distinct from 
the Development Agenda because it would focus on the effects of evolving 
innovation paradigms, which cut across countries at every level of 
development.  Nonetheless, it would benefit from WIPO’s experience with 
the Development Agenda, which has already taken a peripheral interest in 
some aspects of open and collaborative innovation and in preservation of 
the public domain.19  One of the tasks involved in proposing an Innovation 
Policy Agenda must be to reconsider current WIPO projects in light of a 
broader view of the global innovation regime.  In particular, WIPO should 
reconsider its attempt to develop a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) 
in light of a broader innovation mandate, just as it has been urged to do 
with respect to development and access issues.20   
Rochelle Dreyfuss has considered in detail various legal mechanisms 
by which the WTO might incorporate WIPO input in interpreting TRIPS 
flexibilities under Articles 27, 30, and 31 in light of the Policies and 
                                                                                                                          
17 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, REPORT ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 2 (Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/ 
scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_3.pdf; WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTS, SUMMARY BY THE CHAIR, annex (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.wipo. 
int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_4_rev.pdf.  The standing Committee on the Law of Patents 
(SCLP) has long been stymied in its efforts to devise a Substantive Patent Law Treaty by a divide 
between developed countries favoring strong protection and less developed countries concerned with 
facilitating access.  As discussed below in more detail, infra nn. 241–43 and accompanying text, 
changing innovation practices may shake up the familiar alliances. 
18 See Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 48–52 (discussing potential models for the WIPO-WTO 
relationship). 
19 See DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 8, at paras. 16, 17, 23, 27, 35, 36, 45 (recommending 
policies to facilitate innovation and openness in intellectual property systems). 
20 See Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: 
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 90–92 (2007) 
(arguing that the proposed SLPT would negatively impact both developing and developed countries); 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PROPOSAL BY ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR WIPO, annex at 2–3 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31 
_11.pdf (suggesting that new intellectual property protections under the SLPT would obstruct access to 
information). 
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Objectives set out in Articles 7 and 8.21  As part of an Innovation Policy 
Agenda, WIPO should consider proposed implementations of TRIPS 
flexibilities from an innovation policy perspective.  Its deliberation 
procedures should be designed—in analogy to notice and comment 
proceedings in domestic administrative law—to provide transparency and 
participation22 sufficient to endow the results with persuasive weight in the 
deliberations of WTO dispute resolution panels and the TRIPS Council.23  
Alternatively, as also discussed by Dreyfuss, the formal role of WIPO in 
interpreting TRIPS could be expanded either by amending TRIPS to 
provide for deference to WIPO interpretations or by expanding the joint 
activities of WIPO and the TRIPS Council as a means of incorporating 
WIPO views indirectly through the TRIPS Council.24  
These suggestions for implementing a broader-based innovation policy 
are constrained, of course, by the language of TRIPS itself.  While there is 
arguably considerable leeway in TRIPS, its provisions, which prohibit 
technological “discrimination,”25 mandate a case-by-case approach to 
compulsory licensing,26 assume that all exceptions to strong patent rights 
should be “limited,”27 and require that all patentees be afforded exclusive 
rights of use,28 were not designed with user innovation, or open and 
collaborative innovation in mind.  In the end, these provisions may not 
stretch far enough to accommodate newer innovative paradigms in an 
optimal manner.   
An even more ambitious approach to WIPO involvement would be to 
amend TRIPS to provide a more open-ended exception provision which 
would accommodate evolving innovation practices by providing a more 
explicit role for WIPO in vetting potential exceptions in light of innovation 
policy.  For example, one might imagine replacing Article 30 with a broad 
provision permitting exceptions that are “reasonably calculated to promote 
innovation and not to restrain trade” and explicitly providing that Articles 
                                                                                                                          
21 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 25–33. 
22 For discussions of issues of accountability, transparency, and participation in global governance 
see, for example, Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra note 11, at 690–91; Esty, supra 
note 11, at 1527–37; Kingsbury et al., supra note 11, at 37–40; Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 11, at 
220–24. 
23 Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 22, 42, discusses the way in which WIPO and its predecessors 
have employed publications and studies to play a key role in shaping the substantive debate about the 
contours of IP protection in the past. 
24 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26–31.  See also Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 49–50, discussing a 
possible role for WIPO as an “expert agency,” though concluding that it would be preferable for the 
WTO to be the primary setter of global IP norms.  Id. at 54–58.  WIPO’s structure and procedures 
would have to be re-tooled in order for WIPO to play this type of formal vetting role.  I float the 
possibility here, but leave detailed discussion of how WIPO would be organized to play this role for 
another day. 
25 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27. 
26 Id. art. 31. 
27 Id. art. 30. 
28 Id. art. 28. 
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27 and 28 are subject to such exceptions.  WIPO evaluations of the 
reasonableness of particular exceptions as a matter of innovation policy 
could then be afforded a degree of deference.  Such an approach would be 
desirable only if WIPO’s vetting procedures met minimal standards of 
transparency and accountability, of course, and there is room for debate as 
to the proper degree of deference that should be afforded to WIPO 
determinations.29    
Finally, a re-tooled WIPO would also provide a forum for discourse 
and possible standard-setting regarding issues specifically raised by new 
modes of innovation that are not covered by TRIPS with its mass market, 
seller-based focus.  In particular, an innovation policy organization would 
provide a forum for debate about appropriate licensing forms for open and 
collaborative innovation projects; standards for competition policy in 
relation to such collaborative projects, including, for example, patent 
pools; issues of exhaustion and of repair and reconstruction, which are of 
relevance for user innovation; and proposals for navigating the boundaries 
between collaborative projects and proprietary inventions on the one hand 
and the public domain on the other.   
There are a number of private organizations currently involved in 
global standard-setting for open and collaborative projects.30  A global 
innovation policy organization could learn much from such organizations, 
some of which have adopted rulemaking procedures strikingly similar to 
those required under domestic administrative law regimes.31  Perhaps such 
organizations should simply be left to their own devices.  However, if the 
collaborative limited commons paradigm is emulated more broadly, it 
might be appropriate to consider some limitations or standards to govern 
the extent to which commons arrangements should be permitted to fence 
off the public domain through private, albeit distributed, ordering.32  In any 
event, the point here is not to answer, or even to pose, all of the substantive 
questions that would fall within the purview of an international innovation 
policy organization, but only to query whether the global governance of 
innovation would benefit from a more flexible, broadly-based center of 
innovation expertise.  Encouragingly, the WIPO Standing Committee on 
                                                                                                                          
29 See Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26–27 (discussing “the legitimacy of relying on standard 
generated by WIPO” in interpreting TRIPS). 
30 E.g., Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); Free 
Software Foundation, www.fsf.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); Open Source Initiative, 
www.opensource.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); CAMBIA’s BiOS (Biological Open Source) 
Initiative, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008); Patent 
Commons Project, www.patentcommons.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2008). 
31 For example, the Free Software Foundation uses a highly structured online public comment 
procedure for reviewing drafts of its licenses.  Free Software Foundation, http://gplv3.fsf.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2008). 
32 For articles that discuss the limitations of private ordering, see Dinwoodie, Private Ordering, 
supra note 12, at 168; Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1434–35; Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 407–20; 
Rai, supra note 12, at 1440–42. 
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Patents has recently shown an inclination to consider some of these 
broader innovation policy questions.33  The proposal here would be to shift 
the focus of WIPO’s portfolio to put innovation policy front and center, 
regarding IP as only one mechanism for innovation, rather than focusing 
on IP, with merely a secondary concern for innovation policy more 
generally.  
In pursuing any of these objectives, it will be important to consider 
how to provide transparency and accountability.  Here, WIPO’s experience 
with the Development Agenda should be instructive.34  Because innovative 
paradigms cross national boundaries and may bring together developing 
and developed country inventors, it will be important to allow for the 
participation of a variety of stakeholders in the discourse, including 
countries, NGOs, user innovators, open and collaborative innovation 
groups, and the commercial sector.  The Internet itself opens up more 
expansive possibilities for voice even beyond increased participation by 
recognized groups—a global online version of notice and comment is a 
practical possibility that would permit the development of innovation 
policy itself to tap into the same emergent and heterogeneous expertise that 
drives some of these newer innovation paradigms.35 
In Part II, I begin by describing the emerging paradigms of user 
innovation and open and collaborative innovation and go on to explore 
some of their relevant features.  In Part III, I discuss the shortcomings of 
the current TRIPS-based regime as a means of promoting global 
innovation, arguing that the trade paradigm underlying TRIPS distorts 
innovation policy and discussing how current TRIPS provisions may 
                                                                                                                          
33 See REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 16, at 35–38 (discussing 
open technology standards and collaborative research projects such as open source software, the 
proposal for a medical research and development treaty, and public-private research projects); 
SUMMARY BY THE CHAIR, supra note 16, at 2 & Annex (reiterating the issues discussed in the Report 
on the International Patent System, agreeing to further discuss their significance, and establishing 
preliminary studies on several issues). 
34 See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 13, at 272–76 (describing the opening up of WIPO to broader 
participation during the period leading up to its adoption of the Development Agenda). 
35 For related ideas to promote online participation in governance, see, for example, Cynthia M. 
Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 
39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433, 532–40 (2006) (proposing that WIPO host an online forum for 
commentary and debate about potential biopiracy and other moral and policy issues raised by particular 
patents); Steven Charnovitz, Economic and Social Actors in the World Trade Organization, 7 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 259, 274 (2001); Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, 
Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 143 (2006) (proposing the peer-to-
patent review process); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 433, 433–38 (2004) (discussing the potential, generally, for online public participation in notice-
and-comment rulemaking in the United States domestic context); http://gplv3.fsf.org (showing the 
discussion process used by the Free Software Foundation in developing its GPL licenses); 
www.peertopatent.org (discussing an experimental project inviting online review of patent applications 
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office).  See also Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade 
Organization in 2020, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L RELATIONS 167, 182–88 (2005) (arguing for broader 
participation and greater transparency in the WTO generally). 
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impede the full realization of the potential of these newer innovation 
modes.  Part IV discusses the proposal for re-imagining WIPO.  Part V 
concludes. 
II.  THE (RE)-EMERGENCE OF USER INNOVATION AND OPEN AND 
COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION 
The twenty-first century has seen an explosion in user innovation and 
in open and collaborative innovative activity.  These modes of innovation 
have very different characteristics from the mass market seller-based 
innovation which was the model for TRIPS.36  They are simultaneously 
more global and more local than the mass market paradigm.  They rely 
much less than the traditional paradigm on IP for incentives to invent, 
disclose, and disseminate,37 make use of sticky information which is 
distributed heterogeneously in the population and of diverse experiences 
and knowledge,38 and often are heavily reliant on ongoing contractual or 
social ordering rather than on isolated arms-length transactions.39 
While these practices are unlikely to replace the mass market seller-
based innovation paradigm wholesale, they already pose a serious 
challenge to that paradigm in some arenas—particularly in the production 
                                                                                                                          
36 See BENKLER, supra note 4, at 1–2, 35–40 (discussing traditional commercial models and the 
emergence of non-commercial models of information sharing); VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 1–5; 
supra text accompanying note 4–5. 
37 See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 1, 5 (2004) (discussing the nonproprietary 
nature of open source code); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369, 423–40 (2002) (discussing effective peer production, diverse motivations, and the 
commons and incentives problems); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for 
Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 483–90 (discussing implications of user innovation for 
patent doctrine); Dietmar Harhoff et al., Profiting from Voluntary Information Spillovers: How Users 
Benefit by Freely Revealing Their Innovations, 32 RES. POL’Y 1753–54 (2003), available at 
http://userinnovation.mit.edu/papers/3.pdf (discussing “free revealing” of proprietary information and 
its incentives, explanations, and effects); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source 
Licensing, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 20, 21–22 (2005); Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers 
Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 3, 3 (J. Feller, B. Fitzgerald, S. Hissam, K. R. 
Lakhani eds., 2005), available at http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Sloan-School-of-Management/15-
352Spring-2005/D2C127A9-B712-4ACD-AA82-C57DE2844B8B/0/lakhaniwolf.pdf.  
38 See BENKLER, supra note 5, at 408–12; VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 8–9; Christian Luthje, 
Cornelius Herstatt & Eric von Hippel, User-Innovators and “Local” Information: The Case of 
Mountain Biking, 34 RES. POL’Y 951, 951–52, 962–63 (2005) (discussing users’ tendency to use “local 
information”); Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the Private-Collective 
Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. SCI. 209, 210–13 (2003); Eric von Hippel, 
“Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 
429, 429–32 (1994) (discussing the impact of information stickiness on innovation).  
39 See supra note 12; see also Arti Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for 
Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES 131–34 (Robert W. Hahn, 
ed. 2005); Nikolaus Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support Innovative Activities: An 
Exploration of Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES. POL’Y 157, 157–58 (2003); Sapna 
Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1747–
48 (2007) (discussing the legal challenges posed in devising an open innovation model for synthetic 
biology). 
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of platform information technology40—and are likely to increase in 
importance over time.  Moreover, there is no reason to believe that these 
relatively recent developments represent the end of evolution of global 
innovation practice.  Instead, recent history suggests that we would be wise 
to “expect the unexpected” and anticipate an evolving innovation policy 
regime. 
A.  User Innovation  
Cyclists interested in off-road cycling invent the original mountain 
bikes.41  Steel manufacturers develop improvements on the Bessemer steel 
process that lead to an eight-fold increase in production in a ten-year 
period.42  Users of printed circuit computer-aided design software modify 
and develop the software to accommodate increasingly densely-packed 
circuit boards.43  Surgeons improve and modify medical equipment for 
their own use.44  Builders develop means for routing wiring through 
commercially available “stressed-skin panels” used to form the outer walls 
of houses.45  An operator of an online store develops a method of 
streamlining the payment process for frequent customers.46  A research 
scientist develops a new instrument for measuring the chemical 
composition of a surface.47 
The above are all examples of user innovation.  In earlier studies, Eric 
von Hippel and others demonstrated that “users of products and services—
both firms and individual consumers—are increasingly able to innovate for 
themselves” in many fields of technology.48  Several recent developments 
exemplify the increasing relevance of user innovation to the traditional IP 
regime.  For example, open source software is significantly driven by user 
                                                                                                                          
40 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37, at 94–108 (discussing the evolution and growth of the Unix-
based operating system, Linux). 
41 See Guido Buenstorf, Designing Clunkers: Demand-Side Innovation and the Early History of 
Mountain Bikes, in CHANGE, TRANSFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT 54, 61 (John Stan Metcalfe & 
Uwe Cantner eds., 2003).  
42 Peter B. Meyer, Episodes of Collective Invention 7 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Working Paper No. 368), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=466880.  
43 Glen L. Urban & Eric von Hippel, Lead User Analyses for the Development of New Industrial 
Products, 34 MGMT. SCI. 569, 571–73 (1988). 
44 Christian Lüthje, Customers as Co-Inventors: An Empirical Analysis of the Antecedents of 
Customer-Driven Innovations in the Field of Medical Equipment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 32ND 
EMAC CONFERENCE (2003) (on file with author). 
45 Sarah Slaughter, Innovation and Learning during Implementation: A Comparison of User and 
Manufacturer Innovations, 22 RES. POL’Y 81, 83–88 (1993). 
46 See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Injunction against Barnesandnoble.com is Overturned, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 2001, at C3, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYTFile (discussing patent dispute between 
Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble over “One-Click” ordering method).  
47 William Riggs & Eric von Hippel, Incentives to Innovate and the Sources of Innovation: The 
Case of Scientific Instruments, 23 RES. POL’Y 459, 460–63 (1994). 
48 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 1.  
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innovation.49  Besides providing products with mass appeal, such as Linux, 
the open source process provides a means to pool inventive resources to 
obtain customized software products to suit the needs of dispersed and 
relatively small groups of users.50  The expanding patentability of the tools 
and products of agriculture, such as genetically modified seeds, brings 
agricultural firms into conflict with farmers who have a long tradition of 
innovation for their own use.51  The extension of patentable subject matter 
to encompass business methods in the United States has been met with 
skepticism.52  Underlying this skepticism may be an implicit recognition 
                                                                                                                          
49 See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 87; Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 34, at 3, 6–7 
(discussing users’ motivations for working on open source software); James E. Bessen, Open Source 
Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods 1–3 (B.U. Sch. of L., Working Paper, 2005), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=588763 (stating that free/open source software is a complement to 
proprietary development by extending the market).  
50 Open source software projects are extremely diverse in their participation rates.  There is also 
great diversity in the nature of participation—from proposing to administering to developing to merely 
commenting on projects.  A 2002 empirical study of open source projects on www.sourceforge.net, 
probably the most popular platform for open source development, showed that the mean number of 
developers for one hundred mature projects studied was about six.  Sandeep Krishnamurthy, Cave or 
Community? An Empirical Examination of 100 Mature Open Source Projects, FIRST MONDAY, 2002, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_6/krishnamurthy/.    
51 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 247–52 (2003); David R. Downes, The Convention on Biological 
Diversity: Seeds of Green Trade?, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 168 (1994); Ho, supra note 35, at 455–59 
(discussing the conflict between patents, genetic resources, and traditional knowledge in developing 
countries); Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1917, 1917–18, 1920–21, 1926–28 (2007) (discussing the patenting of genetic material in developing 
countries); Haley Stein, Note, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, 
Trade, and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 161–64 (2005) (discussing 
seed modification and commodification and its implications). 
52 See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-
Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 833–36 (2003) (arguing that patents on business 
methods are a monopolization of a line of business); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method 
Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 267 (2000) 
(discussing the negatives of allowing patents of software-embodied business methods); Alan L. 
Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1495 (1999) (similarly 
arguing that software-embodied business method patents should not be patentable subject matter); Julia 
Alpert Gladstone, Why Patenting Information Technology and Business Methods Is Not Sound Policy: 
Lessons from History and Prophecies for the Future, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 217, 218–19 (2002) 
(arguing that patenting internet business methods stifles innovation and rewards existing monopolies); 
Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of Proprietarian 
Norms—The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 321–25 (2005); Keith E. Maskus & 
Eina Vivian Wong, Searching for Economic Balance in Business Method Patents, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 289, 290–93 (2002); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 580–
81 (1999); Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
309, 309–11 (2002) (arguing that the death of the business method exception will lead to a patent 
flood); Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense, 
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 
61–62 (2002); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139,1141–
43 (1999).  See also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of cert as improvidently granted); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (raising questions about business 
methods patents and the Federal Circuit’s standard for patentable subject matter); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479, *154–*194 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting).  But 
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that intent to use rather than sell has traditionally motivated the invention 
of business methods.53  Scientific researchers are also user innovators, 
inventing research tools and methods in the course of their research.54  
Nevertheless, universities are increasingly (and controversially) patenting 
scientific research tools.55  
While user innovation has no doubt always been widespread, its 
significance is growing because of technological changes since the 
negotiation of TRIPS in 1994.  The growing importance of software, as 
both a tool of innovation and a component of products, means that more 
and more design and experimentation is feasible with relatively limited 
capital expenditure.56  Computerization of manufacturing and design also 
decreases the cost of creating custom-designed products.57  The Internet 
also enhances the potential for user innovation by providing mechanisms 
by which medium-sized groups of users with similar needs for 
customization can pool their inventive resources, thereby widening the 
range of cost-effective user innovations.   
User innovation is of greatest importance where users have both 
unique local information about their needs and the technical capacity to 
make inventions that fulfill those needs.  The comparative advantage of 
user innovation for a particular technology depends on factors such as the 
heterogeneity of uses, the presence of lead users, the technical difficulty of 
invention in a particular field, and the costs of development.58  For present 
purposes, its most important features are its de-emphasis on the “incentive 
to invent” justification for IP, its reliance on heterogeneous experience and 
                                                                                                                          
see, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 987, 1081–83 (2003) (arguing that business method patents are indistinguishable from other 
patents on processes). 
53 For a more extensive discussion of this case, see Katherine J. Strandburg, What If There Were a 
Business Method Use Exemption to Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV 245, 248 (2008). 
54 See Riggs & von Hippel, supra note 47; Strandburg, supra note 37, at 459.   
55 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The 
Delicate Balance Between Current and Future Technical Progress, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INFORMATION WEALTH 107–08 (Peter Yu ed., 2006) (reviewing the longstanding debate over whether 
there should be an exemption to patent infringement for research use); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public 
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored 
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1726 (1996) (positing that the patenting of upstream research tools 
calls into question the appropriateness of public funding to support that research). 
56 See BENKLER, supra note 5, at 68–75 (giving examples of peer production); id. at 212–33, 277–
78 (discussing the cost of communication, examples of dissemination of information through network-
based media, and the greater participatory role of individuals using networked media in fostering 
discourse and formulating culture); VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 177 (“[T]here is a general trend 
toward an open and distributed innovation process driven by steadily better and cheaper computing and 
communications.”). 
57 Stefan Thomke & Eric von Hippel, Customers as Innovators: A New Way to Create Value, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2002, at 74, 74–79. 
58 See VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 70–76 (discussing circumstances under which users are low-
cost innovators); Joachim Henkel & Eric von Hippel, Welfare Implications of User Innovation, 30 J. 
TECH. TRANSFER 73, 73–74 (2005) (discussing in detail the welfare implications of user innovation in 
comparison and relationship to manufacturer innovation). 
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on tailoring innovation to specific uses (which undercuts the international 
trade conception of commodity knowledge goods) and its recursive nature, 
which heightens the importance of questions of control and private 
ordering between users and manufacturers. 
1.  User Innovation and the IP Incentive Story 
In sharp contrast to the standard seller-based view underlying most 
discussions of the societal justifications for the patent system, user 
innovators expect to benefit primarily from developing and using an 
innovation rather than selling it.59  User innovators may also derive non-
pecuniary returns from innovation, such as enjoyment of the process of 
improving products for their own use, reputational status within a user 
community, or opportunities to gain skills.60  Patents thus play a relatively 
minor role in motivating them to invent.61  Besides motivating invention, 
patenting should also motivate disclosure and dissemination of inventions.  
Elsewhere, I have discussed in detail the ways in which patenting affects 
incentives to disseminate and disclose user innovations, concluding that on 
balance patent incentives tend to be much less important for user 
innovations than for seller innovations.62  In part this is because a rather 
surprising amount of “free revealing” of user innovations takes place.63  
Presumably, this is because free revealing has significant reputational, 
reciprocal, and other benefits to user innovators.64  This is partly because 
users often form innovative communities in which they exchange ideas in a 
collaborative fashion to the mutual advantage of group members.65  Free 
revealing may enable others to improve on a user innovation, thus making 
that innovation more valuable to the original user innovator.66  Free 
                                                                                                                          
59 For discussions of the traditional incentive theories of patenting, see, for example, Roger D. 
Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 78–80 (2001); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? 
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 90–93 (2004). 
60 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 85–88. 
61 Strandburg, supra note 37, at 483–85. 
62 Id. at 483–87. 
63 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 77–80; see also Joachim Henkel, Selective Revealing in Open 
Innovation Processes: The Case of Embedded Linux, 35 RES. POL’Y 953, 955, 960–62 (2006) (noting 
various industries in which free revealing takes place and explaining its utility). 
64 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 77–80; Harhoff et al., supra note 37, at 1756; Eric von Hippel & 
Georg von Krogh, Free Revealing and the Private-Collective Model for Innovation Incentives, 36 R&D 
MGMT. 295, 297–301, 304 (2006).  
65 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 93–94; Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of 
Research Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF IP (Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss et al., eds. forthcoming 2009) (discussing sharing of research tools among scientists); Franke 
& Shah, supra note 39, at 158–60, 164, 174; Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community 
Norms at the Boundary between Academic and Industry Research, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009) [hereinafter Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms] (discussing and modeling sharing in 
user innovator communities).   
66 See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
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revealing occurs even between competitors, who sometimes prefer to share 
certain kinds of information freely while competing in other ways.67   
In general, then, patent protection is both less necessary and more 
socially costly for user innovations than for seller innovations. 
2.  User Innovation and Heterogeneous and Local Knowledge 
User innovation is also mismatched with the mass market seller-based 
innovation paradigm because it is heterogeneous and relies on distributed 
local knowledge.  Users develop innovations that respond to their specific 
needs and situations, leveraging their information advantages rather than 
manufacturers’ advantages in large-scale production.68  Many user 
innovators are lead users who develop their innovations by customizing or 
modifying commercial products to satisfy their specific needs,69 often 
anticipating features for which general consumer demand has not yet 
developed.70  A study of innovations in mountain biking equipment, for 
example, found that user innovations often depended on dispersed, local 
information reflecting the inventors’ cycling experiences, unique 
circumstances, and interests, such as a desire to bike in extreme weather 
conditions or to perform acrobatic stunts.71  Transferring this experiential 
knowledge to manufacturers can be expensive, making user innovation 
more efficient, in many cases, than attempting to teach manufacturers what 
diverse users want.72 
Particularly in the international context, user innovation may be 
necessary in order for a technology developed in one environment to be 
useful in another.73  It may be extremely difficult for a manufacturer to 
acquire the local experiential knowledge needed to customize a technology 
for its best use in circumstances different from those for which it was 
                                                                                                                          
67 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 10, 87–88; Harhoff et al., supra note 37, at 1753, 1756; Henkel, 
supra note 63, at 954; Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms, supra note 65. 
68 Sonali K. Shah, Open Beyond Software, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0: THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION 
339, 341–43 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Shah, Open Beyond Software]; Sonali K. 
Shah, From Innovation to Firm Formation in the Windsurfing, Skateboarding, and Snowboarding 
Industries 32–33 (Univ. of Ill., Working Paper No. 05-0107, 2006) [hereinafter Shah, From Innovation 
to Firm Foundation], available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/ 
1/8/4/9/9/p184994_index.html (hyperlink “From Innovation to Firm Formation in the Windsurfing, 
Skateboarding, and Snowboarding Industries”, then hyperlink “Application PDF”); VON HIPPEL, supra 
note 4, at 45–46, 49. 
69 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 22–24. 
70 Id. at 22. 
71 Id. at 72–73. 
72 See Henkel & von Hippel, supra note 58, at 73–74, 79–80 (arguing that users innovate more 
efficiently than manufacturers, because as consumers they know what innovations they want). 
73 See B. Douthwaite et al., Why Promising Technologies Fail: The Neglected Role of User 
Innovation During Adoption, 30 RES. POL’Y 819, 819, 830–32 (2001) (explaining that user innovations 
improved farming technologies during the Green Revolution in Asia); see also Anil K. Gupta, From 
Sink to Source: The Honey Bee Network Documents Indigenous Knowledge and Innovations in India, 1 
INNOVATIONS 49, 49–50, 65 (2006) (reporting on a project attempting to document local innovations 
and to “forge links” between local innovators and university researchers). 
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originally designed.  Even an innovation targeted to a foreign market may 
fall flat without user participation in the design.  A study by B. 
Douthwaite, J.D.H. Keatinge, and J.R. Park, for example, probed the role 
of user innovation in adoption of agricultural technologies intended to 
assist development in Asia.74  The researchers concluded that user 
innovation and interaction between the technology originators and local 
users are critically important, especially as technologies or local 
agricultural systems become more complex.75  Recognizing this, Anil 
Gupta and his Honey Bee Network provide a means of documenting, 
sharing, and commercializing grassroots user innovations in India.76 
3.  User Innovation and the “Permission to Innovate” IP Culture 
Another relevant feature of user innovation is the extent to which it 
involves functional improvements to existing technology.77  While users 
may be large corporate entities, often they are individuals unlikely to 
engage in ex ante licensing transactions to obtain “permission to 
innovate.”78  Moreover, because user innovation often occurs as a side 
effect of use rather than deriving from a research and development 
program, even corporate users may not plan in advance to improve on the 
technologies they are using.  Because users tend to make heterogeneous 
functional inventions while manufacturers tend to make innovations that 
spring from their expertise in standardization, safety, ease of manufacture, 
and returns to scale,79 user innovation and manufacturer innovation are 
often recursive, meaning that an ongoing dialogue of innovation is most 
productive of technological advance.80  These characteristics of user 
innovation mean that the patent law doctrine of repair and reconstruction,81 
the first sale (or patent exhaustion) doctrine,82 and the extent to which 
                                                                                                                          
74 Douthwaite et al., supra note 73, at 819–20. 
75 Id. at 834–35. 
76 Gupta, supra note 73, at 61–64. 
77 See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing the important role of “lead user[s]” of 
existing technologies in user innovations); Henkel & von Hippel, supra note 58, at 75 (arguing that 
lead user innovations are eventually in demand in the mainstream market). 
78 Viktor Braun & Cornelius Herstatt, Barriers to User-Innovation: The Paradigm of “Permission 
to Innovate,” in 2006 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 176 (2006) (discussing problems posed by a “permission culture”).  Henkel & von 
Hippel, supra note 58, at 75. 
79 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 66, 70–71. 
80 Henkel & von Hippel, supra note 58, at 75, 82–84. 
81 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[3] (2005).  The repair and reconstruction 
doctrine holds that a purchaser of a patented item may repair it without the permission of the patentee 
as long as the repairs do not amount to a complete reconstruction of the patented item (essentially 
making a new item).  See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342, 346 
(1961) (discussing the doctrine as it relates to automobile repair). 
82 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 170 L. Ed. 2d 996, 1000, 1003 (2008) 
(Supreme Court reaffirmation of the patent exhaustion doctrine).  The first sale doctrine holds that a 
patentee’s rights are “exhausted” when a patented product is sold, leaving the purchaser free to do with 
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purchasers’ rights to use and modify their purchases may be limited by 
non-negotiable license and contract terms (such as those involved in recent 
controversies involving farmer seed-saving practices)83 are important in 
determining whether there are barriers to user innovation. 
4.  User Innovation and Development 
While user innovation occurs throughout the world, it seems likely that 
user innovation is of particular importance to developing countries.84  The 
local needs and preferences of citizens of developing countries are less 
likely to be accounted for in mass markets both because those citizens will 
be less likely to constitute economically important blocks of consumers 
and because mass market goods are likely to be designed in developed 
countries.85  User innovation thus is an important means of adapting mass 
market technologies to the needs of developing country citizens.  User 
innovation building upon a primary technology is also more likely to be 
within the capacity of some developing country innovators, who may lack 
sophisticated engineering training but be able to exploit local knowledge 
and expertise in their innovative activities.86  Thus, though making space 
for user innovation in the global IP regime is of general importance, it may 
be of particular importance to the developing world. 
B.  Open and Collaborative Innovation 
The opening years of the twenty-first century have seen an outpouring 
of interest in the deployment of open and collaborative processes for 
innovative endeavors.87  The buzzwords “open” and “collaborative” have 
been used to describe projects ranging from more distributed approaches to 
                                                                                                                          
it as he or she wishes.  United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917). 
83 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1026 & n.3, 1028–29, 1142 (1998) (discussing similar issues in the context of 
copyright protection); Liam Seamus O’Melinn, Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property 
Revolution is Undermining Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 168–72 (2007) 
(discussing “suicide seeds” which do not propagate, thereby preventing farmers from using seeds 
procured from harvest); Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around 
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 133 (2006) (arguing that 
“[b]y licensing chattels rather than selling them, intellectual property owners can circumvent public 
legislation and expand the protection of intellectual property far beyond the scope envisioned by 
federal and state governments”).  
84 See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 51–61 (discussing local innovations in India). 
85 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing 
Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1051–55 (2005) (addressing the 
issue of under-production of goods for developing countries in the context of medication).  
86 See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 54, 61 (giving as examples a tractor built from scrap 
materials by a grassroots innovator with a fourth grade education, as well as a method of using cow 
urine for cooking fuel invented by a local farmer). 
87 For a fascinating compendium of relevant articles about many forms of “open” innovation, see 
OPEN SOURCES 2.0 (Chris DiBona, Mark Stone, and Danese Cooper, eds., 2006).  See generally 
BENKLER, supra note 5 (discussing the issues raised in this section).  
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innovation by commercial firms88 to data repositories such as the Human 
Genome Project,89 to works created entirely by online collaborations, such 
as Wikipedia.90  Open and collaborative innovation is common among user 
communities.  Studies have documented the phenomenon among users of 
sports equipment, computers, early automobiles, the eighteenth century 
iron industry, scientific research tools, and, of course, open source software 
itself.91   
While the most prominent and well-studied example of open and 
collaborative production is open source software,92 in recent years, the 
focus has shifted to attempts to bring the power of open and collaborative 
innovation to bear on problems in agriculture and biotechnology.93  Some 
of these projects revolve around putting together databases for use in 
bioinformatics research.94  Still others attempt to put together portfolios of 
technological building blocks and tools and then make them available to 
participants in a limited commons, who agree to constraints on their uses 
of the tools and obligations to contribute to the growth of the commons.95  
The most recent potential entrant into this field is synthetic biology.  
Synthetic biology aims eventually to provide a true engineering approach 
to biological innovation by using a commonly available set of genetic 
building blocks to produce a variety of customized biological products.96 
                                                                                                                          
88 See, e.g., HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING 
AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY 93–94 (2006) (discussing IBM’s transition to open innovation). 
89 See, e.g., Kapczynski et al., supra note 85, at 1071 (describing the Human Genome Project as a 
“commons-based initiative[]”). 
90 Wikipedia: About, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
91 E.g., Shah, Open Beyond Software, supra note 68, at 340–41; VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 27–
28; Franke & Shah, supra note 39, at 157–58; Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open 
Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation 3–4 (Univ. of Cal., 
Berkeley Sch. Of Law, Working Paper No. 368, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543; 
Meyer, supra note 42, at 4–7; Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse That Roared: Resistance and 
Accommodation to Patenting in Academic Science, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (forthcoming 
2006); Shah, From Innovation to Firm Formation, supra note 68. 
92 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37 (describing the success of open source software). 
93 E.g., Rai, “Open and Collaborative” Research, supra note 39, at 131; Andrés Guadamuz 
González, Open Source: Licenses in Scientific Research, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 321, 323–24, 333 (2006); 
Yann Joly, Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia Revisited, 59 ME. L. REV. 385, 386–87, 
389, 391, 394–95 (2007); Stephen M. Maurer, Open Source Drug Discovery: Finding A Niche (Or 
Maybe Several), 76 UMKC L. REV. 405, 410, 413–15 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to 
Revolution? Patent-Based Open Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 340, 361–62 (2007); Rai, supra note 12, 
at 1441. 
94 See, e.g., International HapMap Project, http://snp.cshl.org/thehapmap.html.en (last visited Oct. 
11, 2008). 
95 See, e.g., About PIPRA (The Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture), 
www.pipra.org./en/about.en.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008) (describing their work helping those in 
developing countries access new agricultural technologies); CAMBIA Initiative for Open Innovation, 
www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008) (providing tools for working 
toward a “commons of capability” in the life sciences). 
96 Joachim Henkel & Stephen M. Maurer, The Economics of Synthetic Biology, 3 MOLECULAR 
SYS. BIOLOGY 117, 117 (2007); Kumar & Rai, supra note 39 at 1745; Arti Rai & James Boyle, 
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Open and collaborative innovation embodies a fundamentally different 
view of the innovative process than the traditional seller-oriented paradigm 
that motivates high protection IP regimes.97  The traditional model assumes 
that innovation is the province of “inventors,” who must be awarded 
exclusive rights over their innovations to motivate them to make relatively 
large investments of time, money, and effort so that they can go above and 
beyond the ordinary skill in the art.98  Because of this focus on investment, 
some sense of the fungibility of inventive effort underlies the traditional 
model. 
The basic insight underlying open and collaborative innovation, on the 
other hand, is that in some situations it is more effective for contributors to 
an innovative project (who are often current or potential users) to self-
select their own tasks based on their own interests, experiences, and 
expertise rather than for a project manager either to assign tasks to a pre-
existing Research and Development (R&D) team or to search for and 
locate individuals with the necessary skills and experience.99   
Though community-based innovation involving collaboration and 
reciprocal sharing is probably as old as human society, the Internet and 
other digital technology dramatically extend the possible scope of such 
community-based approaches.  First, technology allows many more people 
to participate in a given project, by providing access and mechanisms for 
structuring tasks and by facilitating communication that can overcome the 
high overhead often inherent in attempts to scale up cooperative 
activities.100  Second, technology allows collaborators to match up 
dispersed sources of problems and solutions, expanding the diversity of 
                                                                                                                          
Synthetic Biology: Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 5 PLOS 
BIOLOGY e58, e58 (2007). 
97 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 5 at 35–58 (exploring the economic aspects of innovation and 
non-market production of innovation); Rai, supra note 39 (proposing collaborative research as a new 
model for medicine and biotechnology).  See generally OPEN SOURCES 2.0, supra note 87 (providing 
detailed analysis of numerous aspects of open and collaborative innovation); Benkler, supra note 37 
(analyzing Linux through the prism of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm); Harhoff et al. supra note 34 
(discussing why free revealing, though surprising to economists, benefits innovators and users of 
technology). 
98 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 5, at 42 (describing the “Romantic Maximizer” as the “ideal-
type strategy that underlies patents and copyrights,” and as a “single author or inventor laboring 
creatively—hence romantic—but in expectation of royalties, rather than immortality, beauty, or 
truth.”). 
99 See Benkler, supra note 37 at 406–23 (contrasting the process through which workers are 
assigned tasks in the traditional firm with the process through which workers find tasks in a “peer 
production enterprise”).  The formation of innovation “teams” in this manner is only one example of a 
larger phenomenon of emergent group activity.  See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY 109 
(2008) (describing the trend towards group activity using a variety of examples, including the 
development of Wikipedia). 
100 In the software world this problem is known as Brooks’s Law.  Fred Brooks coined what 
became known as Brooks’s Law in his book The Mythical Man-Month.  FREDERICK P. BROOKS, THE 
MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH (1975).  Brooks’s Law states: “Adding manpower to a late software project 
makes it later.”   Id., at 25. 
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experience and expertise brought to bear on a problem and making it more 
likely that someone with the right set of skills will address the problem.101   
Four features of open and collaborative innovation are particularly 
important here.  First, like user innovation, open and collaborative 
innovation does not rely in traditional fashion on IP-based incentives to 
invent, disclose, and disseminate.  Second, like user innovation, it makes 
use of heterogeneous and local knowledge.  Third, open and collaborative 
innovation is often not nationally based, but rather makes use of a global 
network of digitally linked innovators.  Finally, open and collaborative 
innovation raises questions concerning private ordering and governance, 
which do not figure importantly in the traditional IP paradigm. 
1.  Incentives for Open and Collaborative Innovation. 
Open and collaborative innovation regimes all rely, almost by 
definition, on motives for participation that are not premised on exclusive 
control of innovative results by individual participants.  While in some 
cases these motives are purely hedonic, the crucial insight that allows these 
models to propagate beyond the realm of hackers and hobbyists is that 
participation in open and collaborative innovation can provide other 
rewards that are either equal to or better than the rewards of proprietary 
innovation.102  These rewards are primarily of four types: inexpensive and 
flexible use benefits; tailoring of the product to heterogeneous specific 
needs; benefits related to participation in the project itself (such as 
enjoyment, skill-building, and reputation enhancement); and 
complementary benefits (such as the ability to base a business model on 
the availability of the collaboratively produced innovation or otherwise use 
the innovation as a platform for some other rewarding purpose).103  The 
fact that an open and collaborative process allows tasks to be divided 
among many innovators also reduces the requisite investment in the project 
by most contributors, making it more likely that these other benefits will be 
sufficient to incentivize participation.104 
                                                                                                                          
101 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 37, at 414–15 (“The widely distributed model of information 
production will better identify who is the best person to produce a specific component of a project, all 
abilities and availability to work on the specific module within the specific time frame considered.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
102 See, e.g., Eric von Hippel, Horizontal Innovation Networks–By and for Users, 16 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 293, 304–07 (2007) (describing the benefits of free-revealing and noting that those 
benefits can outweigh those provided by patent or licensing protection). 
103 See Benkler, supra note 37, at 423–43 (describing contributors’ motivations in terms of 
monetary rewards, intrinsic hedonic rewards, and social-psychological rewards); Harhoff et al., supra 
note 37, at 1759–67 (developing a model to systematically assess the profitability of a user/innovator’s 
decision to share or hide information); von Hippel, supra note 102, at 304–07 (2007) (describing the 
benefits of free-revealing); Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 37, at 3–12, 23 (identifying career 
advancement, the feeling of creativity, connection with the hacker community, user need, and the 
opportunity to improve programming skills as important motivators). 
104 Benkler, supra note 384 at 435. 
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Many participants in open and collaborative innovation are prospective 
users of the innovative results.105  There are a number of reasons that users 
might choose to participate in an open and collaborative endeavor rather 
than going it alone, waiting for a commercial product to become available, 
or attempting to free ride off the open and collaborative projects of others.  
As discussed above, users of a technology have different and localized 
information about their needs and experiences than that which 
manufacturers have.106  Transferring this information to manufacturers is 
costly for both users and manufacturers.107  In many cases, collaborating 
with other users is very effective, providing a way to develop 
improvements that manufacturers are not yet ready to adopt and to pool 
user interests and experiences so that each participant gets back a result 
that is worth more than the cost in time or money of her own 
contribution.108 
2.  Heterogeneity and Reliance on Localized Knowledge 
Open and collaborative innovation projects must compete with 
proprietary means of production, which will often benefit from 
manufacturing expertise, economies of scale, the ability to hire experts, 
marketing expertise, and so forth.109  Open and collaborative innovation 
will be preferable when there are advantages to be gained from a dispersed 
approach.  A dispersed approach is most likely to succeed where 
innovation bumps up against heterogeneity—either in the needs of users 
for customized and adapted products or in the capabilities, experiences, 
and insights that are necessary to produce the innovation.   
There is, of course, a Hayekian dispersed information component to 
the IP system itself—patents are intended to elicit investment in projects 
which will fulfill consumer demand and encourage inventive activity by 
those who demonstrate likelihood of success, either by their own 
willingness to put up the money for their R&D efforts or by their ability to 
attract investment from others.110  The problem with the IP approach is that 
                                                                                                                          
105 See, e.g., Harhoff et al., supra note 37, at 1768 (“[P]romoting the development, free revealing, 
and widespread utilization of user innovations may often be in the best interest of profit-seeking user-
innovators, and welfare improving as well.”); von Hippel & von Krogh, supra note 64, at 296–97 
(noting that the practice of free-revealing innovations is widespread in the user communities of several 
different technologies). 
106 See infra notes 68–76 and accompanying text. 
107 See generally von Hippel, supra note 38 (discussing “sticky” information and how such 
information is costly to transfer from one party to another). 
108 See Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms, supra note 65, for a simple model of these 
tradeoffs. 
109 VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 70–71. 
110 See F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 95 (1948) (“[T]he real problem is 
rather how it can be brought about that as much of the available knowledge as possible is used.  This 
raises for a competitive society the question, not how we can ‘find’ the people who know best, but 
rather what institutional arrangements are necessary in order that the unknown persons who have 
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it does not scale well to innovation that would proceed best by iterative and 
collaborative input from a large number of diverse inventors performing 
relatively modular tasks.  The pace of obtaining and licensing patents is too 
slow and the transaction costs are too high for a dispersed collaborative 
approach to be workable.  Firm-based collaborative innovation, on the 
other hand, requires a high degree of a priori top-down management to 
assemble a team of personnel with the necessary variety of expertise.  
Firm-based research and development thus unavoidably reproduces some 
of the difficulties inherent in a command-and-control approach to 
innovation that justify having a patent system (rather than direct 
government funding of R&D or a prize system) to begin with.  While 
patent pools can provide means of sharing technology in industries where 
innovation is performed by large repeat-player firms, patent pools are also 
too inflexible to permit highly dispersed, heterogeneous collaboration 
between self-identified participants. 
Because they are based on a different paradigm of innovation, open 
and collaborative approaches will likely produce different innovative 
results than a mass market proprietary system.  Importantly, an open and 
collaborative innovation project leaves users with the ongoing freedom to 
tinker with, reconfigure, and recombine the resulting innovations.111  
Platform technologies produced in an open and collaborative fashion may 
combine many of the robustness advantages of mass production with the 
ability to tailor and build upon the platforms to meet heterogeneous 
needs.112  An open and collaborative innovation process can produce both 
highly robust products with widespread appeal (such as Linux) and 
customized products that appeal to heterogeneous needs (such as many of 
the small open source software projects on SourceForge).  These 
heterogeneous, “long tail” products may not have the robustness of a mass-
produced product, but without the open and collaborative innovation 
process they would not exist at all.113 
3.  Global Network Organizational Structure 
The potential for open and collaborative innovation is, by its nature, 
                                                                                                                          
knowledge specially suited to a particular task are most likely to be attracted to the task.”).  Hayek 
himself was skeptical about the effectiveness of IP in producing valuable innovation.  F.A. HAYEK, The 
Origins of Liberty, Property and Justice, in THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 36–37 
(W.W. Bartley, III ed., 1988). 
111 See, e.g., Nikolaus Franke & Eric von Hippel, Satisfying Heterogeneous User Needs via 
Innovation Toolkits: The Case of Apache Security Software, 32 RES. POL’Y 1199 (2003) (asserting that 
an “innovation toolkit,” such as the one in Apache software, helps satisfy diverse user needs). 
112 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 
192–94 (2004) (discussing how the adaptability of software like Apache helps satisfy diverse user 
needs, and that this is a reason that commercial companies might contribute to open innovation). 
113 CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG-TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF 
MORE (2006).  
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constrained by the nature of communication technology.  In the past, 
collaborative enterprises often involved localized face-to-face 
communities.114  They also employed available communication 
technologies such as letter correspondence, trade publications, and 
journals.115  While many projects still employ those “old-fashioned” 
collaborative methods, the Internet has led to an explosion of collaborative 
potential by reducing the cost and increasing the speed of long distance 
communications, permitting the rapid communication of both text and 
graphics, and allowing communication at a distance to come close to 
replicating the many-to-many character of discussions in geographically 
localized communities.116  The search capabilities of the Internet also make 
it possible for dispersed groups of potential innovators to find one another, 
thus making customized innovation more feasible. 
The result of these communication advances is that the open and 
collaborative innovation paradigm is able not only to find, make use of, 
and respond to heterogeneous and localized preferences and experience but 
also to operate via a global networked organizational structure which is not 
defined by geographical or political boundaries.  The increasing 
importance of software and other information as products and as tools for 
producing customized products also means that this global network 
sometimes can replace not only the research and development capacity of 
the industrial sector but also its manufacturing capability. 
4.  Governance and Private Ordering in Open and Collaborative 
Innovation 
Despite the occasional rhetoric of some enthusiasts, one should not 
think of open and collaborative approaches to innovation as necessarily 
“emergent” or “self-organizing” in any strong sense of those terms.  Most 
open and collaborative projects are not centrally organized in the 
assignment of tasks or even in the selection of tasks to be accomplished. 
Nonetheless, most have some coordination of control over decision-
making concerning the final product and some means for resolving 
disputes.117  And while some open and collaborative innovation is 
structured almost entirely by unarticulated social norms (such as those of 
the traditional scientific research community),118 many projects have more 
                                                                                                                          
114 See generally Meyer, supra note 42, for historical examples. 
115 Id. at 8–11.  
116 Benkler, supra note 37, at 404–06. 
117 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37 at 157–71 (explaining how open source projects are 
coordinated through individual incentives, cultural norms, and leadership); Benkler, supra note 37 at 
441–43 (describing the integration and quality control processes of various peer production 
enterprises). 
118 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology 
Transfer, in ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
VOLUME 16, at 102–07 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005) (discussing the social norms of scientific 
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formal governance structures which often involve centralized decision-
making of some kind and sometimes involve highly centralized control 
over official versions of the project results.119  One way to look at open and 
collaborative innovation, then, is as an alternative to the firm which, like a 
firm, structures transactions to internalize and systematize them and thus 
reduce their costs, but which also exploits a market-type information 
processing system for the assignment of tasks and design of the product.120 
Open and collaborative innovation is thus not unstructured, but 
differently structured from seller-based innovation methods.  It requires a 
fairly high degree of private ordering, much of which depends not only on 
IP law but also on other legal structures, such as contract and licensing 
law, and on social structure such as community norms.121 
In order to structure and govern their collaborative endeavors, at least 
some innovation projects, while purporting to eschew proprietary 
limitations, rely heavily on IP protections as means of controlling the uses 
which can be made of the results of their efforts and of controlling who has 
access to them.  Thus, collaborative projects are structured around not only 
the need to organize the efforts of the collaborative process, but also the 
need to delineate and govern the unavoidable and increasingly important 
boundaries between open and collaborative innovation and proprietary 
approaches.122   
These privately ordered “open” regimes often create not untrammeled 
contributions to the public domain but limited commons environments in 
which innovators seek to exercise significant hegemony over the uses of 
their innovations.123  The most well-known example of such a regime is the 
use of the “copyleft” or “viral” clause of the General Public License (GPL) 
                                                                                                                          
researchers, and how those norms might change in response to legal and policy changes); Emmanuelle 
Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 
19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2008) (describing the social norms that French chefs follow to respect one another’s 
intellectual property).  See generally Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999), for an explanation of the term 
“norm” and the role of norms in basic research. 
119 See, e.g., ERIC RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND 
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 87–92 (2001) (discussing the concept of 
“ownership” of open source projects); WEBER, supra note 37, at 88–93 (using the example of Linux 
and its creator Linus Torvalds). 
120 Benkler, supra note 37, at 406–23. 
121 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37 at 84–86 (discussing how open source licensing produces 
social structure); Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 11–35 
(2006) (discussing whether the GNU GPL is a contract or a license, and the implications for 
enforceability).  
122 See, e.g., Siobhan O’Mahony & Beth Bechky, Boundary Organizations: Enabling 
Collaboration Among Unexpected Allies, X ADMIN. SCI. Q. Y, P (2008). 
123 See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. 
L. REV. 1331, 1357–62 (2004) (discussing legal approaches aimed at preventing “one-sided 
expropriation” of the public domain).  See generally Molly Shaffer van Houweling, The New 
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008) (comparing IP licenses to servitudes in land). 
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copyright license to control downstream uses of open source software.124  
While patent licensing has so far played a much less significant role in 
open source software projects, the importance of patents in both 
constructing and obstructing collaborative projects is certain to increase if 
open innovation practices become more prevalent in areas such as 
biotechnology where copyright protection is unavailable or does not cover 
the relevant aspects of the technology.125  Finally, as “open source” 
projects in biology and other arenas begin to center less around software 
code and more around commonly-held data, trade secrecy is also likely to 
play a more important role in constructing collaborative projects, as a 
means to limit access to commonly held data to those who agree to certain 
rules about use of the resulting innovation.126 
Thus, even “open and collaborative” projects display a balance of 
openness and control.  In structuring the innovative process, many open 
and collaborative projects rely rather heavily on reach-through-type and 
boilerplate licensing practices akin to the shrink-wrap and click-wrap 
licenses often criticized when used by proprietary copyright holders.127  
                                                                                                                          
124 For an explanation of the basic principles of the GPL, see A Quick Guide to GPLv3, 
http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2008).  For the terms 
of the GPL, see GNU General Public License, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.html (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2008).  See also, Kumar, supra note 121 at 8–9 (discussing the terms of the license and 
critiquing the use of the term “viral” to describe it). 
125 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 39 (discussing the possible use of collaborative innovation in 
medicine); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1401–05 (describing the concept of open source patent); Robin 
Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
117 (2004) (arguing that while open source biotechnology may implicate the doctrine of patent misuse, 
it should not be considered as such); González, supra note 93, at 325 (suggesting “a new licensing 
model for patentable scientific research that allows access and dissemination to diverse fields of 
endeavor”); Henkel & Maurer, supra note 96 (examining which IP practices will lead the emerging 
field of synthetic biology to the greatest success); Kapczynski et al., supra note 85 (arguing that public 
sector institutions such as U.S. universities should change their licensing practices to a system that 
improves access to biomedical innovation); Kumar & Rai, supra note 39, at 1749 (noting that 
biotechnology “has already proven difficult for intellectual property law to manage”); Mann, supra 
note 12 (analyzing the relationship between patents and open source technology); Maurer, supra note 
93, at 406–07 (arguing that open source ideas would work well drug development and exploring why 
there is little open collaboration in that field as yet); Merges, supra note 112 (stressing the importance 
of the public domain); David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source 
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004) (assessing the “feasibility of applying open source 
principles to the biotechnology industry”); Petherbridge, supra note 93 (discussing the role of patents 
in creating an “‘open science’ framework”); Rai, supra note 12 (expanding upon Dusollier’s article and 
addressing how open source concepts impact industrial organizations); Rai & Boyle, supra note 96 
(noting that synthetic biology poses special challenges in IP law because the innovations are not 
necessarily protected by copyright). 
126 See, e.g., J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons 
for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 315, 348–51 (2003). 
127 See generally Douglas A. Hass, A Gentlemen’s Agreement: Assessing the Gnu General Public 
License and Its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 213 (2007) (discussing the Gnu 
public license’s application to Linux); van Houweling, supra note 123 (comparing IP licenses to 
servitudes in land); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1239 (1995) (discussing shrinkwrap licenses generally); Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative 
 
 2009] INNOVATION PARADIGMS AND GLOBAL IP REGIME 887 
The GPL is dependent on strong reach-through or “viral” provisions, the 
enforceability of which is bound to vary among jurisdictions and has rarely 
been litigated.128  The Creative Commons “Share Alike” copyright license 
to facilitate open production of creative works is similarly dependent on 
rather strong interpretations of licensing doctrine.129    
The issues of contract, licensing, and competition law raised by the 
governance of open and collaborative innovation practices further 
demonstrate the inadequacy of a view of innovation based solely on a 
simplistic seller-based model. 
5.  Open and Collaborative Innovation and Development 
A premise of this Article is that the need for a broader perspective on 
innovation than that reflected in the TRIPS agreement is a matter of 
immediate concern to developed and developing countries alike.  
Nonetheless, there are aspects of open and collaborative innovation that 
may make it particularly important to the technological advancement of 
developing countries.130  First, of course, is the fact that the fruits of many 
open and collaborative projects will be cheaply available, either as 
software products or as blueprints or data which are made available over 
the Internet.  Quite aside from a low initial price, however, as already 
noted, the incentive structure of these projects means that the results of 
many open and collaborative projects are likely to be highly customizable 
platform technologies.131  Such innovations may be particularly useful to 
developing countries, which may not have the resources to develop their 
own platform technologies, but may have the desire and ability to adapt 
                                                                                                                          
Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563, 644–47 (2004) (discussing licensing of 
open-source software). 
128 See generally Kumar, supra note 121, for a discussion of enforceability problems with the 
GNU GPL. 
129 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 390–91, 395 (arguing that “Creative Commons' ideology 
communicates a strong proprietary message” and that “reliance on a property regime may undermine 
Creative Commons' agenda by further strengthening the regulatory power of property rights”). 
130 See, e.g., Jyh-An Lee, New Perspectives on Public Goods Production: Policy Implications of 
Open Source Software, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 68 (2006) (“[Open source software] presents an 
ideal means by which governments can attempt to substantially lower costs of software acquisition. . . . 
This cost concern is especially pronounced in the debt-laden governments of developing countries.”); 
Daniel F. Olejko, Comment, Charming a Snake: Open Source Strategies for Developing Countries 
Disillusioned with TRIPs, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 855, 877–81 (2007) (arguing that open source 
software is cost-effective for the governments of developing countries and that the intellectual property 
of indigenous peoples can be protected through licensing).  See generally Gilberto Câmara & Frederico 
Fonseca, Information Policies and Open Source Software in Developing Countries, 58 J. AMER. SOC’Y 
INFO. SCI. & TECH. 121 (2007) (discussion of different types of open source software and suitability for 
developing countries); Gupta, supra note 73 (providing a case study of the Honey Bee Network in 
India); Steven Weber, OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (2003), available at 
http://www.ssrc.org/programs/itic/publications/ITST_materials/webernote2.pdf (discussing how 
developing countries can benefit from the use of open source software). 
131 E.g., Mann, supra note 12, at 11. 
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platform technologies to local conditions, preferences, and needs.132  
Whether they are computer programs, seeds, or some other technology, the 
products of open and collaborative innovation will tend, by their nature, to 
lend themselves to local adaptation.  This realization is reflected in 
initiatives aimed at either adopting open source software as a standard for 
government use in developing countries or encouraging its use.133  In South 
Africa, for example, the government in early 2007 adopted a national 
policy for open source implementation.134  The policy commits the 
government both to use open source software as a default choice and to 
encourage its use in the country.135 
The open and collaborative innovation process, to the extent that it 
involves networks of far-flung collaborators in cyberspace, also promises 
to provide opportunities for education, skill-building, and training for those 
in developing countries who have a requisite threshold level of education 
and skills.136  Because many open and collaborative innovation projects 
naturally have a global scope, a country can benefit from local 
participation in such a project without having a local critical mass of 
technical skills necessary for a stand-alone ground-up project.  Though a 
globally dispersed collaborative project is probably most easily conducted 
in the arena of software or some other intangible product, collaborative 
innovation in tangible technology may also be possible through 
communications among dispersed individuals.  Scientists and engineers 
have collaborated at a distance through journals and letters for centuries.  
The Internet provides a potential means to scale up such collaboration to a 
global network of self-identified individuals.  While those in locations 
remote from others with similar technological interests certainly remain at 
a disadvantage, improvements in digital communications provide at least 
some potential for participation by such individuals.137 
                                                                                                                          
132 Olejko, supra note 130, at 880. 
133 See, e.g., Elzio Barreto & Carlos Caminada, Brazil is Extending Microsoft a Challenge; 
Developing Nations Urged to Use Free Software, HOUSTON CHRON., May 12, 2005, at 4, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, HCHRN File; Olejko, supra note 130 at 875–81. 
134 See SOUTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE & ADMINISTRATION, POLICY ON FREE 
AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE USE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 3 (2006), available at  
http://www.oss.gov.za/FOSS_OC_POLICY_2006.pdf; see also http://www.oss.gov.za/ (noting that the 
policy was approved by the Cabinet on February 22, 2007). 
135 Id.  
136 See Chon, supra note 6, at 2897 (discussing the importance of reducing limitations on sharing 
educational materials between nations). 
137 See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 49–50 (utilizing an electronic database, website, and 
newsletter to share traditional knowledge in India).  Of course, the benefits of open and collaborative 
innovation are only of use to those who can deploy the resulting products or participate in the 
innovative process.  Professor Chon and others are clearly correct that there is a need to balance the 
importance of promoting innovation—even as more broadly understood here—with the provision of 
basic human needs such as food, public health, security, and education that are necessary for human 
beings to flourish in many respects, including the ability to participate in creative and innovative 
activity.  Chon, supra note 6, at 2893.  See generally Denis Borges Barbosa, Margaret Chon & Andrés 
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Besides the potential for adopting, adapting, and participating in the 
recent technology-based revival of open and collective innovation 
practices, many developing countries are home to indigenous groups which 
already have traditional open and collaborative innovation practices.138  
Much of the debate about traditional knowledge focuses either on means to 
preserve traditional cultural goods or on finding ways to commodify 
traditional knowledge so that the communities that produced it are 
compensated when others use it.139  Because these questions relate to the 
propertization of knowledge, these discussions are often associated with IP 
(and are included in WIPO’s Development Agenda).140  Perhaps because 
the discussion of traditional knowledge in the international arena is 
motivated largely by a desire to open similar markets for developing 
country knowledge goods, the discussion may not have focused enough on 
the continuing creative potential of such communities.141  One benefit of 
global attention to the potential advantages of open and collaborative 
innovation practices might be to recognize and galvanize the innovative 
potential of indigenous and other more traditional collaborative innovators. 
III.  THE TROUBLE WITH TRIPS: CONSTRAINED BY AN OUTMODED 
INNOVATION PARADIGM 
As mentioned in the Introduction, much of the criticism of TRIPS, as 
well as most of the impetus for the progress reflected in the Doha 
Declarations and the adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda, has 
focused on the failure of TRIPS to balance adequately the need to promote 
future innovation with current needs for access to technology, particularly 
in the public health arena.142  Here I leave aside those pressing concerns 
and focus, in light of the evolving paradigms of innovation explored in Part 
II, on TRIPS—particularly its patent provisions—as innovation regulation.  
TRIPS reflects a particular mass market seller-based view of innovation 
which tends to evoke a one-size-fits-all high protection IP regime.  The 
                                                                                                                          
Moncayo von Hase, Slouching Towards Development in International Intellectual Property, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 71 (2007) (discussing how international intellectual property law must incorporate 
the social welfare goals of developing nations). 
138 See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 73, at 50 (discussing the Honey Bee Network as a source for 
Indian traditional practices). 
139 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1032–34 (2007) (discussing and critiquing the move toward propertization 
of traditional knowledge); Safrin, supra note 51, at 1940 (same).  But see Chander & Sunder, supra 
note 123, at 1345 (pointing out the inequalities often present in access to the non-propertized “public 
domain”). 
140 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 8, at para. 18. 
141 But see Raustiala, supra note 139, at 1034 (expressing concern that propertization of 
traditional knowledge may have negative effects on creativity within indigenous communities); 
Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 109 
(2007) (discussing the innovative nature of traditional cultures in meeting the demands of the market). 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
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high protection baseline of TRIPS reflects, among other things, its primary 
mission as an instrument of trade, rather than innovation, and its genesis 
during a period of manufacturer-based innovation aimed at producing mass 
market goods.143  A trade paradigm based on a concept of static 
comparative advantage144 is best suited to mass market goods, which can 
be effectively designed and produced in one place and shipped off for use 
in another.  
While the pharmaceutical products, off-the-shelf software and mass 
market entertainment products which dominated the context in which 
TRIPS was negotiated might fit this conception, TRIPS locked in a set of 
minimum standards based on the mass manufacturer model at precisely the 
wrong moment.145  As discussed in Part II, the turn of the twenty-first 
century has seen a virtual explosion in the importance of information 
technology, leading to a surge in user innovation and open and 
collaborative models of innovation made possible (and certainly more 
visible) by the World Wide Web and other digital technologies.146  A 
simplistic trade perspective is singularly inapt for these new modes of 
innovative practice.  Indeed, the very concept of “trade” is often in apropos 
since these innovation practices are simply not well-described as means by 
which goods invented and produced in one place are sold in another. 
The TRIPS “minimum standards” commitment to a mass market 
seller-based innovation regime is reflected in its requirement of equal 
treatment of different technological arenas;147 its crabbed approach to 
enforcement exceptions148 (reflecting an assumption that unauthorized use 
constitutes free riding, is nearly always undesirable and should be 
permitted only in closely cabined circumstances); and its stringent 
restrictions on compulsory licensing.149  The lack of any substantive 
maxima for IP protection, along with the agreement’s failure to put any 
                                                                                                                          
143 See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS ix–x (2d 
ed. 2003) (giving an overview and background of the TRIPS Agreement); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE 
POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 3–4 (2003) (arguing 
that TRIPS was molded to protect the markets of particular IP rights holders—notably the major 
pharmaceutical companies). 
144 See, e.g., Bruce Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Helping Infant Economies Grow: 
Foundations of Trade Policies for Developing Countries, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 141 (2006) (arguing for a 
concept of dynamic comparative advantage which would take into account the potential for evolving 
economic capacity). 
145 Steve Charnovitz argues that the “exaggerated claim that TRIPS establishes common 
minimum international standards” is incorrect and countries are free to provide lesser protection to their 
own nationals.  Charnovitz, WTO in 2020, supra note 35 at n.22.  Nonetheless, as Charnovitz 
acknowledges, id. at 171, governments are unlikely as a political matter to provide stronger IP rights to 
foreigners than to their own citizens. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 38–54. 
147 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.  
148 See id. art. 30 (imposing limits on permissible exceptions to patent rights). 
149 See id. art. 31 (setting out limitations on permissible means by which countries can provide for 
use of patented inventions under compulsory licenses). 
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limits on restrictive licensing practices or to deal with private ordering 
more generally, also reflect this myopic focus on one specific innovative 
model.150  While it is certainly desirable to read TRIPS flexibilities more 
expansively than they have been read in the past, it is nonetheless unlikely 
that an international IP regime so thoroughly grounded in a single mass 
market model will be optimally suited to a world of diverse innovation 
paradigms. 
This indictment of TRIPS is not intended to suggest that national 
legislatures have done much better at crafting innovation policy regimes.  
TRIPS was patterned after high protection national intellectual policies, 
particularly those of the United States.151  The United States has been 
struggling to adapt its own patent law to the changing innovation 
landscape, a struggle reflected in stalemates between the pharmaceutical 
and information technology industries in attempted legislative revision152 
and in Supreme Court intervention to dial back some of the rigid 
interpretations of patent doctrine by the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals.153  The point, though, is that it is particularly problematic to 
enshrine a one-size-fits-all approach to innovation in an international 
agreement both because states are likely to be heterogeneous in their 
preferred innovative approaches and because, as a practical matter, re-
negotiating an international agreement is fraught with difficulty.   
With that said, the recent history of TRIPS in the access to medicines 
context does provide some grounds for optimism and a model of how 
regime-shifting,154 and what Scott Burris and collaborators have called a 
nodal approach to governance,155 might lead to incremental progress.156  
                                                                                                                          
150 See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: 
New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205, 214 (2006) (stating 
that international treaties should contain user rights); Dreyfuss, supra note 6 (arguing for explicit 
protection of user rights in international patent law). 
151 See references supra note 143. 
152 See Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
389, 389–91 (2007) (discussing the divergent interests of the two sectors).  
153 E.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008); KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734–35 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 
1760 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007); eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 193, 207 (2005). 
154 See Chon, supra note 6, at 2855; Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement 
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 42–43 
(2004) (discussing the response to TRIPS in the context of essential drugs); Peter K. Yu, International 
Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 
27 (2007).  See generally Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing, Changes in Governance: 
A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing the 
evolving mechanisms of international governance); Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in 
Intellectual Property and Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 
TEMP. L. REV. 363 (2004). 
155 Burris et al., supra note 11, at 33.  See generally John Braithwaite, Methods of Power for 
Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 297 (2004); Scott 
Burris, Governance, Microgovernance and Health, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 335 (2004); Peter Drahos, 
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Further, a number of commentators have suggested creative approaches to 
interpreting TRIPS Articles 27 and 30 flexibly, especially in light of the 
Objectives and Principles outlined in Articles 7 and 8.157  These attempts 
are commendable and essential to the promotion of innovation globally.  
Here I provide only an overview of the substantive challenges to adapting 
TRIPS to new modes of innovation before focusing in Part IV on 
administrative mechanisms for an evolving international innovation policy 
regime. 
A.  TRIPS as an Instrument of Trade in “Knowledge Goods”: A Poor Fit 
with Emerging Innovation Paradigms 
The fact that TRIPS is first and foremost a trade instrument, focused 
on opening global markets to an existing pipeline of products rather than 
on promoting innovation in any broader sense, undermines its effectiveness 
of TRIPS as an innovation regime.  It leaves little room for adapting the 
global IP regime to new and diverse innovative practices.  Strong IP 
protection presents itself as an apparently natural supplement to a free 
trade regime so as to permit (and encourage) developed countries to exploit 
a comparative advantage in production of intangible knowledge goods.   
Innovation is not a good fit for this comparative advantage model 
except in the short term.  The comparative advantage concept depends on 
the idea that global welfare will be improved when countries specialize in 
the types of production they do best.  However, the concept of comparative 
advantage is inappropriately static and simply inapt when applied to 
innovation.158  Innovative capacity is essentially a kind of infrastructure, 
like roads and communication networks, which underlies the ability to 
develop other capacities.  Because diverse perspectives further innovation, 
enhancing global welfare may depend on spreading innovative capacity 
                                                                                                                          
Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 
401 (2004).  These authors argue that “nodal governance” is a weapon that can be employed by both 
the weak and the strong.  Specifically, Drahos describes the original methods by which the 
pharmaceutical industry obtained a high protection patent regime as an example of nodal governance, 
Drahos, supra, at 405–06, yet argues that nodal governance provides an opportunity for developing 
countries with respect to traditional knowledge, Drahos, supra, at 420–21.  Thus, it remains unclear 
whether the shift toward a less state-based international governance regime will benefit developing 
countries in the IP debate in the long run.  For general discussions of this issue see Burris et al., supra 
note 154, at 1–2; Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 11, at 222–23. 
156 See, e.g., Yu, supra note 6, at 401–02. 
157 See, e.g., Barbosa et al., supra note 137, at 105–06; Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying 
Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 447–48; Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 22–23; Christopher 
Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD), Issue Paper No. 17, at 19–42 (2006), available at 
http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11716/. 
158 See Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 144, at 141. 
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broadly.159  Since copying and building on pre-existing technology are 
means of developing innovative capacity, strong IP rights may preclude 
some countries from ever developing the innovative capacity needed to 
develop and exploit a comparative advantage in some as-yet-undetermined 
arena of innovation.160  
Moreover, the focus on trade assumes an unrealistic fungibility 
between innovations produced in different countries.  Because, as 
discussed in Part II, inventors are heterogeneous, innovation is 
simultaneously more global and more local than the production of mass 
market goods.  Innovation in many cases builds incrementally on a global 
pool of previous experience and technology and, as demonstrated by the 
global scope of open source software projects, the best innovation may 
combine ideas from individuals in widely dispersed locales.  On the other 
hand, many innovations are responsive to and tailored for local 
circumstances and needs.  Without local input, an imported invention may 
fall short of its potential to increase welfare.161  This means that it is in the 
global interest for every nation to develop the infrastructure and skill set to 
engage in technical innovation so that it can both contribute to the global 
pool of ideas and produce goods and services that are desirable in its 
particular circumstances and culture.  Innovation is not something which 
can simply be “out-sourced” to another country.  Just as users play an 
important and different innovative role from manufacturers because of 
their ability to tap into dispersed local knowledge, local innovators are 
essential to the development of desirable technologies for local contexts.   
The importance of user experience as a spur to innovation also 
suggests that the balance between first comers and follow-on innovators, 
which can be neglected when the focus is on opening up present markets, 
may be particularly important in the global context.  The optimal balance 
between opening markets for knowledge goods, incentivizing foreign 
investment, and allowing the “freedom to tinker” as a means of developing 
local innovative capability and customizing innovation to local needs is 
likely to vary from one country to the next and from one technology to the 
next.  Even where economic resources would be available in principle to 
provide a “demand pull” to foreign inventors to provide technology 
tailored to local circumstances, there is good reason to believe that 
transferring the knowledge of local circumstances required for such 
tailored innovation to foreign companies would be expensive and difficult.  
Even in the United States and Europe, where the capacity of technology 
                                                                                                                          
159 For broad discussions of the relationship between IP, innovation, and human capabilities, see, 
for example, Chon, supra note 6, at 2885; Samuelson, supra note 10, at 590–91. 
160 See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 58–59 (1997). 
161 See, e.g., Douthwaite et al., supra note 73, at 820 (discussing agricultural examples); Gupta, 
supra note 73, at 49–50 (exploring a local network in India as a source of ideas). 
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companies is high and the market for consumer goods is well-oiled, users 
are still predominant in producing leading edge functional improvements 
in many areas.162  In fact, industry has begun to realize the importance of 
harnessing user experience as an engine of innovation and firms are 
experimenting as to the best way to do so.163  The simplistic view of the 
world as divided into “producers” and passive “consumers” is breaking 
down in most arenas, yet the TRIPS Agreement’s focus on trade and static 
comparative advantage obscures the dialectical nature of the innovation 
process.  
The trade paradigm is also inappropriate for many platform 
technologies which are the locus of much of today’s open and 
collaborative innovative activity.  These technologies, such as computer 
software, are foundational to the conduct of commerce and the production 
of a variety of goods and services.  Because of the important role they play 
in facilitating other aspects of economic activity, there are strong national 
interests in autonomous control of these technologies.164  Technical 
excellence is not the only measure of social benefit in these cases.  This is 
particularly true because of the ongoing relationships between purchasers 
and manufacturers of these technologies inherent in modern licensing 
practice, as well as in the need for compatibility between different 
programs running on different computer hardware.  For a country to be 
entirely dependent on a foreign company for its basic software platforms is 
comparable not merely to having a foreign company build some of its 
roads or airports, but to having a foreign company run the tollbooths or air 
traffic control, maintaining ongoing control of a vital infrastructural 
resource.  At least some software and digital technology is a strategic 
resource to which the concept of comparative advantage is at least partly 
inapplicable. 
Moreover, tying innovators globally to a particular innovation model 
ends up betraying the very tenets of free trade itself.  Free traders do not 
argue that all countries should agree to a single approach to mining their 
natural resources regardless of whether geological factors, the labor 
market, and so forth are varied.165  Instead, the free trade premise of 
comparative advantage assumes that each country will compete on the 
                                                                                                                          
162 See e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 97 (discussing “hackers” who tailored software to their 
specific needs). 
163 See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 4, at 133–34 (discussing “lead user idea-generation 
techniques”); Nikolaus Franke & Frank Piller, Value Creation by Toolkits for User Innovation and 
Design: The Case of the Watch Market, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 401, 402 (2004) 
(analyzing user innovation toolkits from the customer perspective). 
164 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 371 
(2005) (giving examples of use of government procurement power to shape technology). 
165 Although, as Greenwald & Stiglitz point out, the temptation to view countries’ comparative 
advantages in too static a fashion is one to which free traders too often succumb in general.  Greenwald 
& Stiglitz, supra note 144, at 141. 
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basis of its own most efficient means of production.166  A global 
commitment to a one-size-fits-all innovation model may well have the 
perverse result of privileging a mode of innovation that is less efficient in 
producing a particular technological advance.167   
B.  TRIPS Flexibilities and Evolving Paradigms of Innovation 
TRIPS sets out minimum standards of IP protection.  For patents, 
TRIPS specifies various minimum requirements involving patent coverage, 
term, associated rights, and remedies for infringement.168  Of particular 
interest for our purposes are Articles 27 and 28, dealing with patentable 
subject matter and rights conferred, respectively.  With certain exceptions, 
Article 27 requires countries to make patents available “for any inventions 
. . . in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application,” severely 
constraining the possibility of a nuanced approach to patentable subject 
matter.169  Article 27 also requires that patent rights be “enjoyable without 
discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”170  Article 28 mandates 
that patents confer on their owners exclusive rights “to prevent third parties 
not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering 
for sale, selling, or importing” their patented inventions.171  Article 33 adds 
to the constraints by mandating a patent term of twenty years which may 
be badly mismatched with the cumulative and collaborative pace of 
invention in some areas.172   
These basic all-encompassing requirements clearly reflect the mass 
market seller-based innovation paradigm.  In requiring that patents be 
available without discrimination for all fields of technology, TRIPS 
reflects the assumption that patents are equally appropriate and effective 
for promoting innovation in all fields of technology.  Similarly, in 
mandating that patent rights include rights of exclusive making and use, 
along with exclusive rights of sale, TRIPS reflects an assumption that all of 
these exclusive rights are needed to promote innovation.  User innovation 
and open and collaborative innovation undermine these basic assumptions.  
As discussed in Part II, the effectiveness of these alternative innovation 
approaches varies depending on issues such as the modularity of a 
particular technology, the extent to which users of a technology are likely 
                                                                                                                          
166 See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Electronic Uncertainty Within the International Trade Regime, 15 
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1379, 1382–83 (2000) (describing the basic free trade concept of comparative 
advantage).  
167 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 456. 
168 TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 27, 28, 33, 44. 
169 Id. art. 27. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. art. 28.  
172 Id. art. 33. 
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to have heterogeneous needs or diverse insights, the extent to which users 
and other distributed innovators have the technical capacity to improve a 
technology, the social structure of a particular technical field, and the 
availability of benefits from innovation other than those obtained by selling 
it.173 
The fact that TRIPS fails to incorporate any standards of maximum IP 
protection also reflects a paradigm of innovation in which follow-on 
innovation is either unimportant or occurs within an industry structure in 
which ex ante licensing is an effective means to structure it.174  Such an 
assumption is inadequate even for traditional innovation, where a robust 
public domain plays an important role in promoting innovation.  Yet, it is 
particularly detrimental for user and open and collaborative innovation, the 
distributed and rapidly evolving nature of which undermines the potential 
for ex ante licensing. 
One response to concerns about the mismatch between the underlying 
innovation paradigm embodied in TRIPS and alternative innovation 
approaches is to point to TRIPS flexibilities.  TRIPS itself bolsters the 
argument for a generous view of its flexibilities in Articles 7 and 8 which 
set out its Objectives and Principles, respectively.  Article 7 specifies that: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.175   
Article 8 states that: 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws 
and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be 
needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by 
right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably 
                                                                                                                          
173 See supra text accompanying notes 55–57. 
174 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 150, at 214 (arguing for user rights to be included in 
international treaties); Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 21 (stating that TRIPS protects property holders rather 
than users). 
175 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7 (emphasis added). 
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restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.176  
As has been argued with respect to both access and the traditional IP 
balance, Articles 7 and 8 provide a persuasive basis for interpreting TRIPS 
flexibly so as to encourage and support evolving modes of innovation.177  
In particular, Article 7 should be read as aspirational (rather than as an 
affirmation that IP will fulfill these objectives) and its recognition that IP 
“should contribute” to the goal of innovation understood as an 
acknowledgment of the possibility of other mechanisms for promoting 
innovation.178  Article 8’s statement that members may adopt measures “to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their . . . 
technological development” also provides a possible handle for 
accommodating alternative innovation approaches in the TRIPS context.179   
Nonetheless, Article 8 permits the adoption of such measures only 
when they are “consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”180  Since 
the provisions of the Agreement are slanted toward a high protection 
regime that does not provide any explicit accommodation for evolving 
innovation paradigms, the question is whether the existing flexibilities are 
sufficient to permit us to shoehorn new innovation models into what is at 
bottom a mass market seller-based paradigm.  
Certainly it would be possible to make significant progress.  
Specifically, as argued by Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, and recognized in a recent overview of TRIPS patent exceptions, 
there may be wiggle room in the interpretation of Article 27’s non-
discrimination requirement, allowing for differential treatment of various 
industries as long as it reflects a legitimate purpose.181  However, it is not 
clear that WTO panels will be inclined to interpret Article 27 with the 
expansive degree of flexibility envisioned by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss.  
                                                                                                                          
176 Id. art. 8 (emphasis added). 
177 See, e.g., Barbosa et al., supra note 137, at 109–12 (“Articles 7 and 8 are, beyond any doubt, 
interpretative tools with respect to the meaning of the TRIPS agreement.”); Chon, supra note 6, at 
2829–30, 2835–36 (arguing generally for the use of TRIPS flexibilities in light of Articles 7 and 8 to 
incorporate a “substantive equality” norm); Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without 
Discriminating, supra note 9, at 447 (urging for “an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that . . . 
offer[s] broad latitude to member states to implement their core TRIPS patent obligations”); Dreyfuss, 
supra note 6, at 22–24 (explaining how under-developed countries can benefit from the aspirational 
provisions—Articles 7 and 8—of the TRIPS Agreement); Garrison, supra note 157, at 22 (using Art. 7 
TRIPS in part to analyze Art. 30 TRIPS); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. 
L.J. 827, 863–66 (2007) (describing, in the pharmaceutical context, the impact of TRIPS flexibility on 
the policy and innovation of less developed countries).  
178 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 7. 
179 Id. art. 8. 
180 Id.  
181 See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 449–50 
(“[T]he language of the provision itself may contain latitude to create some level of differentiation.”); 
Garrison, supra note 157, at 39 (showing the wiggle room in Article 27 by presenting two competing 
interpretations of the same provision). 
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One WTO panel, in a dispute involving an exception permitting use of a 
patented invention during the patent term so as to facilitate regulatory 
review, did interpret Article 27 so as to allow “bona fide exceptions to deal 
with problems that may exist only in certain product areas.”182  This 
statement leaves open the question of what makes an exception “bona 
fide,” or, in Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss’s terms, gives it a legitimate 
purpose.183  Particularly in light of Article 7, it would be a colorable 
argument that a WTO dispute resolution body should deem legitimate a 
purpose to promote innovation outside of the IP-based paradigm by, for 
example, providing an exemption from patent infringement for open source 
software.184  A considerable amount of ground work might be necessary to 
make such an argument convincing, however.  It seems likely that WTO 
panels and the WTO appellate body will take a much narrower view of 
Article 27’s anti-discrimination mandate unless they are given a road map 
to a more innovation-friendly approach, a point to which I return in Part IV 
of this Article. 
With regard to exceptions to TRIPS patent minimum standards, the 
agreement provides for “limited exceptions” and compulsory licensing 
under Articles 30 and 31, respectively.185  Article 30 states that: 
Members may provide limited exceptions to the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties.186 
Beyond the exceptions permitted under Article 30, Article 31 provides 
for ex ante compulsory licensing in certain fairly circumscribed situations.  
Most importantly for present purposes, compulsory licensing is permitted 
only on a case-by-case basis and only if “prior to such use, the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not 
been successful within a reasonable period of time.”187  Because of these 
and other limitations, compulsory licensing under Article 31 is unlikely to 
play an important role in making room for user innovation and open and 
collaborative innovation; they do not lend themselves to such case-by-case 
                                                                                                                          
182 WORLD TRADE ORG., CANADA–PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS ¶ 
7.92, WT/DS114/R (2000) [hereinafter CANADA PHARMACEUTICALS]. 
183 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 452.  
184 See Garrison, supra note 157, at 76 (mentioning the possibility of such an exemption in 
passing). 
185 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30–31.  
186 Id. art. 30. 
187 Id. art. 31. 
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and ex ante licensing, especially if a government procedure is required. 
Accommodation to evolving modes of innovative activity under 
TRIPS will thus have to pass muster under Article 30.  The most important 
interpretive questions for this purpose are probably the meanings of 
“limited” and “unreasonably” in Article 30.188  These terms raise crucial 
questions of baseline.  Against what background standard should we 
measure the magnitude or reasonableness of an exception?  To make room 
for alternative modes of innovation, such as user and open and 
collaborative innovation, these terms would have to be interpreted in light 
of the impact of an exception on innovation overall.  This type of 
interpretation would be a far cry from what we have seen so far.  There has 
been only one panel interpretation of Article 30, in the Canada 
Pharmaceuticals dispute.189  As discussed in more detail by Dreyfuss190 
and by Christopher Garrison,191 the panel interpretation construed the 
requirement of a limited exception very stringently—based on the extent of 
impairment of each of the patentee’s exclusive rights, counted individually, 
and permitting only the most minor impairment of any of the rights.   
Garrison argues that the panel’s interpretation is inconsistent with pre-
existing exemptions that were well accepted by TRIPS signatories and has 
limited precedential value in light of the re-affirmation of the importance 
of TRIPS objectives and principles after the Doha Declarations.192  The 
reaffirmation of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS in the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, aimed primarily at issues of access to medicine, may provide 
a hook for efforts to interpret TRIPS flexibilities expansively to account 
for varying modes of innovation.193  The Declaration reaffirms the 
importance of Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS and emphasizes development 
goals.   
It is thus likely that the interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities in the 
patent arena will evolve in light of ongoing concerns about the 
international IP balance.  Nonetheless, there is a long way to come from 
the approach of the Canada Pharmaceuticals panel to the breadth of 
flexibility necessary to accommodate evolving modes of innovation that 
may optimally even replace intellectual-property-inspired innovation in 
some arenas. 
As an example, consider the possibility of exemptions for making and 
use.  TRIPS requires under Article 28 that patent infringement encompass 
                                                                                                                          
188 Id. art. 30. 
189 CANADA PHARMACEUTICALS, supra note 182, at 18–21. 
190 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 14–18. 
191 Garrison, supra note 157, at 23–33. 
192 Id. at 37, 41–42. 
193 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 7, at ¶ 19 (“[T]he TRIPS Council shall be guided 
by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully 
into account the development dimension.”). 
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not only unauthorized sales of a patented invention but unauthorized use 
and making of an invention.194  As I have detailed in earlier work, 
exclusive rights to make and use may be counter-productive in some 
arenas in which user innovation is highly effective. 195  Patent protection is 
less important as an incentive for user innovation than it is for 
manufacturer-centered research and development. Moreover, patent 
licensing is likely to be a costly and ineffective means to coordinate user 
innovation, which arises mostly not from pre-meditated research and 
development, but as a side effect of use combined with “freedom to 
tinker.”  Thus, in some technologies, well-tailored use exemptions may be 
the best way to promote user innovation.  Because a use exemption would 
promote certain kinds of innovation by users while decreasing incentives 
for innovation by certain types of sellers (those whose business models 
involve developing technology easily copied by users), the optimal menu 
of use exemptions is likely to vary from place to place and from time to 
time.   
An optimal international innovation regime would leave room for 
countries to adapt their use exemptions to their innovative strengths.  
However, it is highly questionable whether use exemptions of this sort 
would pass muster under Article 30 as either limited or reasonable.  While 
it is true that research exemptions and exemptions for personal and non-
commercial use are relatively common among TRIPS signatories (and 
hence presumably, though not definitely, acceptable under Article 30),196 
those exemptions are generally premised on a lack of significant 
commercial impact on patent holders.  While the effects on innovation of a 
broader use exemption might be salutary, such an exemption might very 
well have significant commercial ramifications for individual patentees—
and hence not be deemed “limited” under Article 30.  Article 30 reflects 
the one-size-fits-all assumption that patenting is the best way to go to 
promote innovation in every technology.  It will be difficult to stretch it to 
accommodate situations in which patent protection is simply not needed or 
is counter-productive. 
Even where there are colorable interpretations of TRIPS that might 
permit a robust response to evolving innovation mechanisms, it seems 
unlikely—as discussed more fully by Dreyfuss197 and in Part IV of this 
                                                                                                                          
194 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 28. 
195 See Strandburg, supra note 37, at 483–88, 531–41 (explaining the costs and benefits of patent 
protection for user innovations and proposing a blanket exemption for research use of a patented 
exemption or a “double-edged sword” exemption focusing on non-profit researchers); Strandburg, 
supra note 53, at 267–68 (noting that “[P]atent exclusivity for business methods invented by users is 
likely to impose particularly high social costs since user innovators are often motivated to restrict 
dissemination of their inventions . . . .” and advocating a “business method use” exception). 
196 See Garrison, supra note 157, at 44–49 (discussing pre-existing exceptions for non-commercial 
use and for experimentation). 
197 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 14–20. 
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Article—that such interpretations will be forthcoming from WTO dispute 
resolution unless an institution with innovation policy expertise lays the 
analytic groundwork.  Part IV argues that a WIPO exploration of evolving 
innovation modes and their interaction with IP could lay the groundwork 
for interpretation by WTO dispute resolution bodies and the TRIPS 
Council. 
C.  What TRIPS Leaves Out: The Increasing Importance of Private 
Ordering 
In addition to providing insufficient flexibility with respect to 
minimum standards, TRIPS also simply does not deal with many issues 
raised by user innovation and open and collaborative innovation because 
they do not arise under the proprietary seller-oriented paradigm.  In 
particular, private ordering and institutional governance, ranging from 
informal norms to complex licensing arrangements such as patent pools, 
standards, and viral licensing, play critical and still under-theorized roles in 
these newly important modes of innovation.198  IP law both constrains and, 
in some cases, constructs these innovative models. 
In retrospect, it is no surprise that those seeking to construct 
collaborative and commons-like approaches in an innovation landscape 
organized around the proprietary model will use both the IP regime itself 
and other means of private ordering to structure their activities.  Certainly 
intermediate limited commons regimes are plentiful in the real property 
context.199  Nonetheless, there are concerns about potential tensions 
between these limited commons approaches and other normative concerns. 
The construction of limited commons regimes is in some tension, for 
example, with a commitment to the public domain as a resource for 
innovation.  It is very hard to know whether programmers would 
participate in open source software projects without the guarantees 
facilitated by the automatic copyrighting of their code or even whether the 
copyright protection of source code produces more or less software 
innovation on balance.  Questions have also been raised as to whether 
attempts to promote open innovation using the Creative Commons menu of 
                                                                                                                          
198 See generally Dinwoodie, The International IP System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, and 
Private Ordering, supra note 12 (discussing “the increased role of national courts and private ordering 
in developing international norms”); Dinwoodie, Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 167–69 
(explaining the importance of private ordering in copyright law); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1393–96 
(assessing the “normative sustainability” of private ordering of intellectual property in the global 
regime); Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 376 (noting that private ordering is an “attractive option” for 
remedying the rapid expansion of intellectual property rights but expressing concern that private 
ordering relying on intellectual property rights may actually reinforce the property discourse as a 
conceptual framework and a regulatory scheme for creative works); McJohn, supra note 12 at 66–68; 
Rai, supra note 12, at 1439. 
199 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
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copyright licenses lead to more or less building upon the creative work of 
others as compared to a regime in which registration is required to obtain 
copyright protection or even a regime of benign neglect in which most 
authors never bother to enforce their copyrights.200  Similar issues arise in 
the context of university patenting and sharing of research tools within a 
bounded academic community; a number of universities have recently 
advocated licensing approaches that would create a limited commons 
among university researchers by excluding commercial researchers (or at 
least making them pay to use the tools).201  A number of “open biology” 
projects use (or propose to use) contractually limited access to data to 
construct a shared resource despite the fact database protection has been 
adopted in some places, notably the EU, and not in others, notably the 
United States.202  The conflict between the usefulness of strong IP in 
constructing collaborative arrangements and its deleterious effects on the 
public domain is also evident in debates over the protection of traditional 
knowledge.203  Moreover, it is also surfacing in the debate about synthetic 
biology, where some have even suggested extending copyright protection 
to genomic sequences to facilitate a GPL-type approach.204  In general, the 
desire to use IP to construct collaborative space can lead to controversial 
attempts to increase propertization of the intellectual domain.205 
The use of GPL-type licensing raises other normative questions as 
                                                                                                                          
200 See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 407–22 (outlining the limits of private ordering as 
exemplified by Creative Commons in creating a governance regime for creative works). 
201 See, e.g., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology 
(March 6, 2007), available at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf 
(“Universities should reserve the right to practice licensed inventions and to allow other non-profit and 
governmental organizations to do so”); see also Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms, supra 
note 65, at 43–44 (discussing means of establishing an academic research tool commons). 
202 See, e.g., González, supra note 93, at 337–39, 346–50 (discussing the available strategies for 
“open source” scientific databases). 
203 See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 139, at 1032–34 (discussing and critiquing the move toward 
propertization of traditional knowledge); Safrin, supra note 51, at 1921–22 (arguing “that the 
establishment and the expansion of intellectual and other property rights have an internally generative 
dynamic”); see also Chander & Sunder, supra note 123, at 1343–46 (pointing out the inequalities often 
present in access to the non-propertized “public domain” and in the coverage of IP protection). 
204 See, e.g., Rai & Boyle, supra note 96, at e58 & nn. 27–28 (discussing the difficulties in trying 
to evoke copyright to create a synthetic biology commons). 
205 See Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National 
Courts, and Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 63 (noting “the entanglement of intellectual property 
with trade and development”); Dinwoodie, Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 161 (noting the 
balancing act between copyright law and public objectives); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1391 
(“Intellectual property is a complex mix of different interests that either protects an intellectual creation 
by an exclusive and proprietary right or guarantees some free access to, and use of, an intellectual 
creation.”); Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 375 (“[M]any of the new opportunities that were made 
possible by digital technology are increasingly enjoyed by the massive enclosure of the public domain 
and the increasing commodification of information.”); Mann, supra note 12, at 2 (noting how 
collaborative work and propertization are competing interests that are a byproduct of an open source 
approach); McJohn, supra note 12, at 42–43 (reconciling an open source approach with a property 
approach); Rai, supra note 12, at 1439–41; Safrin, supra note 51, at 1922 (introducing the “patent 
paradox”). 
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well.  The open source software process works in part because the licenses 
reach through in varying degrees to constrain and direct the way in which 
licensees use the technology.  Such constraints take on a very different 
normative cast when proprietary firms impose them so as to control and 
limit the ways in which users can engage in tinkering, modification, 
reverse engineering, and sometimes even criticism of the products they 
buy.206  Attempts to deploy open source approaches in realms such as 
biology, where patents, which are expensive to obtain and of somewhat 
indeterminate scope, are the IP of choice, raise further questions about 
using such restrictions to construct a limited commons for collaborative 
activity.207  For one thing, while there may be very little to constrain the 
imposition of such use restrictions by contract, at least under United States 
law,208 patent-based commons arrangements are vulnerable to claims of 
exclusive rights by independent inventors and patent “trolls.”  Copying is 
neither a legal requirement for infringement nor a practical necessity.  
Limitations on use imposed by notice alone are generally unenforceable 
under the doctrine of patent exhaustion recently reaffirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.209  This doctrine complicates the formation of a patent-
based open source project, but may be vitally important for user innovation 
and personal use rights.  Similar issues arise as a result of attempts to 
facilitate “open source biology” that rely on controlling access to databases 
using trade secrecy, contract, and technical protection measures.   
In addition, the open source software process works in part because 
licensing is standardized and automated.  Use restrictions imposed by 
manufacturers in online adhesion-type contracts are highly controversial, 
                                                                                                                          
206 See, e.g., van Houweling, supra note 123 (analogizing to the doctrine of servitudes for real 
property to analyze modern intellectual property licensing practices) and references therein; Lemley, 
supra note 127. 
207 See generally Rai, supra note 39, at 131–33, 151–52 (noting the interplay between open and 
collaborative projects and the biomedical research field); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1401–05 
(discussing open-source patents in the biotechnological field); Feldman, supra note 125, at 117–20; 
González, supra note 93, at 345 (explaining the difficulty in using open source licenses in a 
commercially viable field like biotechnology); Henkel & Maurer, supra note 96, at 1–3 (laying out the 
policy debate regarding an open source approach in the synthetic biology field); Kapczynski et al., 
supra note 85, at 1073; Kumar and Rai, supra note 39, at 1747–48 (“[S]ynthetic biology illustrates a 
tension between different methods of creating ‘openness.’”); Maurer, supra note 93, at 405 
(commenting on the challenging application of open source to difficult innovation problems such as 
complex computer systems and drug discovery); Merges, supra note 112, at 186–87 (“[I]t is possible 
for patents [in the biotechnology field] to create over-fragmentation in this area, and . . . wind up 
deterring innovation instead of encouraging it.”); Opderbeck, supra note 125, at 171 (“Even if open 
source models could work in biotechnology as a practical matter, one must ask the normative question 
whether law and public policy should support such models . . . .”); Petherbridge, supra note 93, at 362–
63 (explaining how an open source approach differs in the life sciences context from other industries); 
Rai, supra note 12, at 1442 (commenting that biotechnology may make drawing the boundaries of the 
commons more difficult); Rai & Boyle, supra note 96, at e58 (“[S]ynthetic biology raises . . . an issue 
[of] the tension between different methods of creating ‘openness.’”). 
208 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 170 L. Ed. 2d 996, n. 7 (2008). 
209 Id. at 1011. 
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but “clickable” use restrictions would no doubt make it easier to extend the 
GPL-type open source approach to patentable subject matter.   
The enforceability of open source software licenses in jurisdictions 
around the globe has barely been tested.210  Countries may well take 
different views of these licensing practices and of attempts to extend them 
to other technologies, raising questions about both the normative and legal 
status of agreements used to create a supposed open and collaborative 
innovation commons with global extent.   
Thus, attempts by collaborative and nominally open projects to fence 
off territory in which there is freedom to operate raise difficult and 
important questions that leave a mass-market-based IP regime like TRIPS 
both overly constraining and too narrowly focused to serve as the focal 
point of global innovation policy.  TRIPS does virtually nothing to regulate 
private ordering through restrictive license provisions or to guarantee use 
rights based on principles of exhaustion or first sale.  Probably fortunately, 
Article 6 specifically excludes the subject of exhaustion from the ambit of 
TRIPS because of disagreements over how to treat exhaustion on the 
international stage (though many bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements cabin 
signatories’ ability to implement expansive international exhaustion 
doctrines).211  Regulation of licensing practices is limited to a permissive 
clause in Article 40 allowing members to “specify[] licensing practices or 
conditions that may . . . hav[e] an adverse effect on competition in the 
relevant market.”212 
Given its genesis, it is not surprising that TRIPS does not address these 
issues.  Until now, TRIPS silence in these arenas may have been a 
blessing—facilitating the development of an open source regime of 
software copyright licensing which takes the potential for strong reach-
through licensing and turns it into a mechanism for collaboration.  
Nonetheless, the growing prevalence of user innovation and open and 
collaborative innovation brings these issues of private ordering and its 
                                                                                                                          
210 See, e.g., Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing Open Source 
and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 464–70 (2005) (discussing the private 
enforcement of GPL’s and the beginning of minimal judicial enforcement); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 
1420–25 (discussing the legal enforceability of open-source licensing); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. 
Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the Benefits of State-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Data Sharing in California’s Stem Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1209 (2006) 
(discussing the enforceability of clickwrap licenses as contracts in court); Kumar, supra note 121, at 
26, 27, 30 (discussing the interpretation of the GPL by a German District Court); Daniel B. Ravicher, 
Facilitating Collaborative Software Development: The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software 
Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2000) (discussing the fact that only four courts have addressed the 
issue of mass-market license enforceability); Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL 
Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451, 453–54 (2005) (discussing the 
enforceability of the GPL in court).  
211 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 6; see also, Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing 
Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1469, 1501–02 (2007) (discussing TRIPS-
Plus agreements and international exhaustion).  
212 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 40. 
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place in shaping the innovation environment to the fore.  It may well be 
that taking into account user and collaborative innovation and its 
interaction with both the manufacture-innovator paradigm and the public 
domain would call for broader-based regulation of private ordering or at 
least for the promulgation of “best practices” or standards for licensing.213   
The point here is not to propose substantive solutions to the problem of 
creating a healthier global innovation policy regime and certainly not to 
suggest that all of these aspects of global innovation practice should be 
subject to international agreements or standards.  On the contrary, the 
continually evolving nature of innovation practice means that states need 
flexibility to adapt their legal regimes to the innovative practices that are 
most appropriate to a particular time and place.214  Just as it was a mistake 
to enshrine an industrial manufacturer-based paradigm of innovation as an 
international norm, it would be a mistake to make an inflexible 
commitment to a particular collaborative paradigm.  At the same time, one 
must recognize the interests in predictability and lowering trade barriers in 
a global innovation market.  The trick is to balance the need for some 
international consistency in a global economy with a diversity of 
innovative paradigms.   
IV.  RE-IMAGINING WIPO:  TOWARD AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH TO 
A HEALTHIER GLOBAL INNOVATION REGIME 
As noted above, there is a broader lesson in the rise of user and open 
and collaborative innovation practices regarding the wisdom of freezing in 
substantive requirements at the international level.  Innovation is 
unpredictable in both its substance and its process.  A rigidly locked-in 
international IP regime, no matter how well tailored at its inception, is 
unlikely to serve innovation well in the long term.  What, then, is to be 
done?  There are no easy answers and there is much to learn about these 
innovative paradigms and others which may emerge in the future as we 
seek to determine the right balance of public domain, proprietary 
“knowledge goods” and privately ordered, limited commons approaches.   
Rather than consider possible substantive mechanisms in more detail, 
this Part discusses possible institutional mechanisms, based on a global 
                                                                                                                          
213 See Dinwoodie, Private Ordering, supra note 12, at 162 (discussing recent examples of 
(possible) international copyright norm formation); Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1392 (discussing why 
intellectual property regimes exist not only in the private domain, but are intertwined with the public 
domain); Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 421 (suggesting that “creating an alternative to copyright 
requires standardization”); McJohn, supra note 12, at 45 (discussing the public interest in private 
ordering); Rai, supra note 12, at 1441. 
214 One should, in fact, view this contention as an extension of the comparative advantage idea 
underlying the original trade-based paradigm to the context of innovation.  See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, 
Diversifying Without Discriminating, supra note 9, at 456. 
 906 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:861 
administrative law approach,215 to facilitate ongoing reform and 
development of global innovation governance.  Specifically, I propose re-
imagining WIPO and its relationship to TRIPS in light of a broader 
approach to innovation policy.  To this end, I will discuss four potential 
roles for WIPO in moving toward a more satisfactory global innovation 
policy regime.   
At a minimum, WIPO should adopt an Innovation Policy Agenda (in 
rough analogy to its recently adopted Development Agenda).216  A WIPO 
Innovation Policy Agenda would provide a focal point for global discourse 
and debate about continually evolving innovation approaches.  Second, 
perhaps as an outgrowth of an Innovation Policy Agenda, WIPO should 
play a greater role in interpreting TRIPS flexibilities and examining 
potential exceptions for TRIPS compliance.  Third, and more ambitiously, 
consideration should be given to the possibility of amending TRIPS to 
provide for an exception authorization broader than is available under 
Articles 27, 30, and 31, coupled with a more explicitly administrative role 
for WIPO in vetting proposed exceptions.  Finally, one might consider 
expanding WIPO’s role to encompass consideration of international 
standard-setting for activities, such as licensing, which are critical for 
innovation yet not a matter of IP law per se.  Any such initiatives would 
need to balance harmonization with allowance for country-specific and 
evolving innovation practices. 
A.  Why WIPO? 
As Rochelle Dreyfuss points out persuasively, TRIPS suffers from a 
law-making deficit because of the rarity and non-precedential character of 
WTO panel decisions. 217  This law-making deficit is responsible at least in 
part for the dearth of examples of states testing the limits of the flexibilities 
currently available in TRIPS.218  The barriers to states adopting patent laws 
that test the TRIPS flexibilities are many, including, in many developing 
countries, the capacity and expertise to implement cutting-edge TRIPS 
interpretations and the political, financial, and human capital resources to 
risk challenges to those interpretations and to pursue disputes before the 
WTO.219  This means that some other mechanism is needed to develop 
                                                                                                                          
215 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
216 See DEVELOPMENT AGENDA documents, supra note 8; see also Halbert, supra note 13, at 255–
62, for an overview of the history of WIPO with particular attention to development issues. 
217 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 1–3. 
218 See Garrison, supra note 157, at 19–23 (detailing a study of patent infringement exceptions 
globally demonstrating their limited scope); see also Ho, supra note 211, at 1495–99 (discussing the 
effects of bilateral Free Trade Agreements on signatories’ flexibility). 
219 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 25–27 (stating that implementing these laws requires either 
that a country have experience with intellectual property protection or sufficient human capital, neither 
of which developing countries have); Yu, supra note 6, at 387 (discussing some of the difficulties 
developing countries face in implementing aggressive interpretations of TRIPS flexibilities). 
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interpretations of TRIPS flexibilities that countries will be willing to adopt.   
The WTO and the TRIPS Council are probably not the right places to 
make progress on a broader understanding of innovation policy in the first 
instance.220  Though they may be capable of implementing a more nuanced 
approach to the TRIPS flexibilities (particularly with some input from 
WIPO), an organization steeped in a trade mandate is unlikely to have 
either the inclination or the expertise to make progress on a broader 
innovation agenda.    
In part because of its recent experience with the Development Agenda, 
WIPO is probably best placed to provide a forum for dialogue about how 
to use TRIPS flexibilities to accommodate broader innovation policy 
concerns.221  This is the case despite complex questions, discussed at 
length by Dreyfuss, about how exactly to incorporate the results of WIPO 
deliberation into TRIPS interpretation under the WTO dispute settlement 
process.222  WIPO has a standing committee structure for consideration of 
IP-related issues, which has already been expanded to include a Committee 
on Development and IP.223  Under the auspices of such committees and 
otherwise, WIPO sponsors conferences, studies, and other forms of 
discourse involving scholars, NGOs, stakeholders, and country 
representatives.  By these means, WIPO could conduct an ongoing analysis 
of how to permit a variety of forms of innovative activity to flourish 
together in a global governance framework.224   
Of course, the relevance of innovation policy is not confined to any 
single international organization.  Indeed, discussion about open and 
collaborative innovation is beginning in a variety of international forums.  
For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) just released its “Information Economy Report 2007-2008, 
Science and Technology for Development: the New Paradigm of ICT,”225 
                                                                                                                          
220 See Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 32–33 (discussing the shift from WIPO to the WTO).  But see 
Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 387, 435–38 (2000) (arguing in favor of an active role for the TRIPS Council as a primary 
forum for TRIPS interpretations). 
221 For an argument in favor of WIPO’s greater involvement in promoting TRIPS flexibilities see, 
for example, Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 21–34.  For general arguments in favor of WIPO taking a 
greater role in promoting a more balanced approach to IP, see, for example, Geneva Declaration on the 
Future of the World IP Organization, available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/ 
futureofwipodeclaration.pdf (discussed in Halbert, supra note 13, at 273–76); James Boyle, A 
Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of IP, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 10 (2004); Halbert, supra 
note 13, at 283–84. 
222 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26–29. 
223 World Intellectual Property Organization, Committee on Development and Intellectual 
Property, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/cdip/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2008). 
224 See Okediji, supra note 14, draft at 22, 42, discussing how WIPO and its predecessor 
organizations have used such avenues to affect substantive global IP norms in the past. 
225 UNCTAD, INFORMATION ECONOMY REPORT 2007–2008, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW PARADIGM OF ICT (2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
sdteecb20071_en.pdf. 
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which recognizes that “ICT has also given rise to new models for sharing 
knowledge and collective production of ideas and innovations,” known as 
“open access” models, “which often bypass the incentive system provided 
by [IP] rights”226 and notes that “[a]n innovation policy framework that 
fully takes into consideration the changes generated by ICT must give 
prominence to open approaches to innovation, which present significant 
advantages for developing countries.”227  Promoting a dialogue on these 
issues in a number of venues will ensure that a variety of perspectives are 
included.  Nonetheless it seems desirable to have a focal point organization 
around which various stakeholders can coalesce and create coalitions of 
participation in the debate.  WIPO is a natural choice for this role in light 
of its expertise in IP and its experience with the Development Agenda.  
Indeed, while one may question WIPO’s capacity and willingness to 
take a broader view of innovation policy in light of its high protectionist 
history and IP-focused mandate, this is an opportune time for a re-focusing 
of WIPO’s mission, given its weakened role in the global IP system after 
TRIPs.  WIPO’s efforts in undertaking the Development Agenda and its 
activities in the arena of traditional knowledge demonstrate a growing 
willingness and capacity to consider ramifications of IP outside of a 
narrow manufacturer-based paradigm perhaps as part of a search to 
preserve its relevance in a post-TRIPs world.228  Building an understanding 
of and expertise in new and evolving innovation paradigms is within the 
purview of WIPO in any event because of WIPO’s role in developing and 
administering most IP agreements other than TRIPS.229  Crucially, WIPO 
has been engaged for some time in attempts to develop a Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty to harmonize further the international patent system.230  
Such efforts clearly raise red flags in light of the problems already visible 
in the substantive harmonization involved in TRIPS minimum standards 
for patent law.  It is very important to ensure that a broader innovation 
policy perspective inform any discussions of further harmonization. 
Though WIPO has clear institutional advantages as a focus for global 
innovation policy setting, WIPO has a checkered history with respect to 
open innovation.  Its Convention sets its primary goal as to “promote the 
                                                                                                                          
226 Id. at 2. 
227 Id. at 12. 
228 One should not be too sanguine about this recent openness, of course.  WIPO’s history is as an 
organization devoted to the promotion of IP rights which has arguably been brought kicking and 
screaming to its present openness to development issues.  See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 13, at 272–76 
(discussing this history).  Nonetheless, of the available institutions in the international IP regime, 
WIPO seems the most likely to be both able and willing to pursue a broader innovation policy agenda. 
229 For a list of WIPO-administered IP treaties, see World Intellectual Property Organization, 
WIPO-Administered Treaties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).  
230 For a discussion of and critique of WIPO’s efforts in this regard, see Reichman & Dreyfuss, 
supra note 20, at 122–29,  
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protection of [IP] throughout the world.”231  Moreover, in 2003, the United 
States government, reportedly as a result of objections from Microsoft and 
related corporate interests, pressured WIPO to rescind a plan to hold a 
meeting on open source approaches.232  At that time Lois Boland, director 
of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
reportedly said “that open-source software runs counter to the mission of 
WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights” and that “[t]o hold 
a meeting which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights seems 
to us to be contrary to the goals of WIPO.”233   
Times seem to be changing, though, as a result of efforts from NGOs 
supportive of open source approaches along with WIPO’s adoption of the 
Development Agenda.  Though a specific reference to open source 
software was removed from the approved version, the Development 
Agenda proposals agreed upon in 2007 contain language that is consistent 
with an important role for user and open and collaborative innovation in 
development.  The approved proposals include calls to “deepen the 
analysis of the implications and benefits of a rich and accessible public 
domain,” to “initiate discussions on how . . . to further facilitate access to 
knowledge and technology . . . and  to foster creativity and innovation[,]” 
to “request WIPO to undertake . . .  studies to assess the economic, social 
and cultural impact of the use of intellectual property systems[,]” and to 
“exchange experiences on open collaborative projects such as the Human 
Genome Project as well as on intellectual property models.”234  These 
proposals provide hooks for consideration of innovation paradigms beyond 
the IP regime.  Moreover, new paradigms for innovation cut across the 
traditional divide between developing and developed countries, splitting 
the perspectives of powerful developed country actors in new ways. 
WIPO is also a good choice as a locus for a broader innovation policy 
agenda because TRIPS itself contemplates the possibility that TRIPS 
interpretation might be influenced by WIPO.  Thus, Article 68 
contemplates that the TRIPS Council, in its activities in monitoring the 
agreement, “may consult with and seek information from any source it 
deems appropriate. In consultation with WIPO, the Council shall seek to 
establish, within one year of its first meeting, appropriate arrangements for 
cooperation with bodies of that Organization.”235  Though the metes and 
bounds of cooperation set out in the subsequently-adopted formal 
agreement between WIPO and the TRIPS Council are narrow and 
primarily technical, the language of Article 68 certainly implies that the 
                                                                                                                          
231 Convention, supra note 13, art. 3. 
232 See Krim, supra note 15. 
233 Id. 
234 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 19, at *16, *19, *35, *36. 
235 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 68. 
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TRIPS Council may consult with WIPO more broadly.236  Though the 
current relationship between WIPO and TRIPS does not warrant explicit 
deference to WIPO positions by WTO dispute resolution bodies,237 it 
certainly places WIPO in a position to begin a dialogue over TRIPS 
interpretation.  As discussed in Section D of this Part, it might eventually 
be advisable to amend TRIPS to provide WIPO with a more formal role in 
TRIPS interpretation. 
B.  An Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO  
An important step toward incorporating consideration of evolving 
innovation paradigms in the global debate about IP law would be for 
WIPO to develop and adopt an Innovation Policy Agenda, along the lines 
of the recently-adopted Development Agenda.  This adoption would take a 
wide view of promoting innovation in the long term and avoid the 
inaccurate perception that open and collaborative innovation is necessarily 
averse to business interests.  Under the auspices of an Innovation Policy 
Agenda, WIPO could provide a forum for vetting interpretations of TRIPS 
flexibilities and proposals for national legislation to accommodate a 
broader approach to innovation.  WIPO could also consider a range of 
issues beyond IP per se related to user innovation and open and 
collaborative innovation. 
Very recently, WIPO has begun to take steps toward recognizing the 
importance of open and collaborative innovation.  For example, a report 
prepared for the June 2008 meeting of the WIPO Standing Committee on 
Patents included sections on licensing, patent pools, collaborative research 
projects (including open source) and a discussion of potential problems 
caused by patent thickets.238  A list of “issues for further elaboration and 
discussion” approved at that meeting includes “alternative models for 
innovation,” “limitations to the rights,” and “research exemption.”239  At 
the July 2008 meeting of the WIPO Committee on Development and IP, 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation presented a statement in which it 
suggested that “WIPO could also provide Member States with information 
about the benefits for education and scientific research of Open Innovation 
and User Driven Innovation models” and that these “new theories of 
innovation . . . have the potential to radically reshape collaboration and 
                                                                                                                          
236 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION AND THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (1995), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/pdf/ 
trtdocs_wo030.pdf; see also Nichols, supra note 166 at 1420–22, summarizing the current relationship 
between the WTO and WIPO.   
237 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26. 
238 See generally REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 17. 
239 SUMMARY BY THE CHAIR, supra note 17, at 2, 4. 
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innovation in the developing world.”240  All of these recent activities lay 
groundwork for a more formal WIPO Innovation Policy Agenda. 
The development of an Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO would 
provide a focal point for various stakeholders with interests in user 
innovation and open and collaborative innovation, along with others, such 
as information technology firms that object to the TRIPS one-size-fits-all 
approach. The political economy already makes it likely that TRIPS 
“flexibilities” will come to be more widely deployed in recognition of the 
needs of the information technology industry with its complex cumulative 
innovation. Participants in user and open and collaborative innovation, and 
those NGOs that support these approaches, should make use of the 
networks of connections which link them to information technology sector 
stakeholders.241  There are great advantages to such an approach because of 
the global network of participants already involved in many user and open 
and collaborative innovation projects; the extent to which the networks of 
participants interpenetrate the networks of commercial stakeholders who 
will be involved in the debate; and the extent to which commercial 
stakeholders are increasingly dependent on the open source community for 
aspects of their businesses.242   
An Innovation Policy Agenda would provide a point of coalescence for 
these parties to mobilize their resources, to create, to deploy, and to link 
nodes so as to affect the process of “nodal governance” that will no doubt 
be involved in the adaptation of TRIPS to the needs of the information 
technology sector.243  Over time, these adaptations are likely to be made 
both directly, by influencing the development of interpretative machinery 
at WIPO or the WTO, and indirectly, by influencing the evolution of 
domestic IP law, which will in turn influence the interpretation of TRIPS.   
Participants in and advocates of open and collaborative innovation can 
also seek to use their networks of connections to influence the increasingly 
successful attempt to account for development concerns in the global IP 
regime.  Already, many developing countries view the use of open source 
software as a beneficial path.244  Advocates for user innovation and open 
                                                                                                                          
240 EFF Statement at WIPO Development Agenda Meeting–CDIP2, Second Session, July 7–11, 
2008, available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2008-July/003378.html. 
241 See, e.g., O’Mahony & Bechky, supra note 122 (discussing the important interactions between 
information technology companies and the open source community). 
242 See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 5, at 122–27 (discussing how social production is altering the 
business environment and the relationships between firms and individuals); WEBER, supra note 37, at 
190–207 (examining business models and experiments in open source); Stephen R. Walli, Under the 
Hood: Open Source and Open Standards Business Models, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0, at 121, 127–35 
(DiBona, Cooper & Stone eds., 2006) (explaining how businesses can use open source software as a 
tool to obtain a competitive advantage); O’Mahony & Bechky, supra note 122. 
243 See Burris et al., supra note 11, at 52–53 (making a similar proposal in the context of the 
debate over public health and access). 
244 See Câmara & Fonseca, supra note 130, at 129–30 (assessing how open source software can be 
promoted effectively in developing countries to help them meet their development goals); Gupta, supra 
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and collaborative innovation should deploy their networks of contacts in 
developing countries and in organizations serving developing countries to 
articulate the role that these forms of innovation play and could play in 
development.245  There is already progress in this direction with the 
proposal for exploration of “open collaborative projects” in the WIPO 
Development Agenda246 and the recent discussions of open innovation 
approaches in the WIPO Committee on Development and IP.  A WIPO 
Innovation Policy Agenda would facilitate this involvement. 
C.  A Notice and Comment Approach to WIPO Interpretations of TRIPS 
Flexibilities 
Particularly as WIPO develops broader innovation policy expertise 
pursuant to an Innovation Policy Agenda or otherwise, it might begin to 
play a more important role in interpreting TRIPS flexibilities and analyzing 
whether possible exceptions comply with TRIPS.  As Dreyfuss argues, the 
WTO Dispute Settlement process is a poor mechanism to provide 
authoritative interpretations of amorphous terms in the agreement that 
might be interpreted so as to provide some flexibility, such as “limited,” 
“normal exploitation,” without “unreasonable prejudice” and so forth.247  
This is in part because dispute settlement proceedings are rare and in part 
because the panels are unqualified to make innovation policy.  Dreyfuss 
argues that an administrative mechanism is needed to give content to these 
terms in light of the purposes of IP in general and of the purposive 
statements incorporated in TRIPS itself.248  She then suggests ways in 
which the existing IP administrative bodies—primarily WIPO and the 
TRIPS Council—might undertake such an interpretive task so as to take 
advantage of WIPO’s expertise in IP policy.249 
My proposal here piggybacks off of her suggestions.  Consideration of 
evolving alternative mechanisms for innovation only reinforces the need 
for an administrative approach.  The infrequent forays into TRIPS 
interpretation of WTO dispute resolution bodies are a completely 
ineffective mechanism for considering and vetting TRIPS exceptions under 
Article 30 once one moves away from the mass market seller innovator 
paradigm, which seeks to minimize exceptions to rigorous enforcement of 
                                                                                                                          
note 73, at 63–64 (describing the success of the Honey Bee Network, which has documented over 
10,000 innovations and examples of indigenous knowledge); Lee, supra note 130, at 68 (explaining 
how developing countries can benefit from the cost savings of open source software); Olejko, supra 
note 130, at 875–81 (discussing steps developing countries can follow to utilize open source software); 
Weber, supra note 130, at 16–17, 20 (discussing the benefits that open source software can bring to 
developing countries). 
245 E.g., Douthwaite et al., supra note 73, at 820–21; Gupta, supra note 73, at 50–51. 
246 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 19, at para. *16, *17, *23, *27, *35, *36, *45. 
247 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 13–18. 
248 Id. at 18–19. 
249 Id. at 19–31. 
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patent protection.  If TRIPS flexibilities are to play a positive role in 
promoting innovation and ensuring that the IP paradigm does not crowd 
out other innovation models, then it is critical to have an ongoing 
discussion not only of whether proposed exceptions would pass muster 
under TRIPS but also of which exceptions make sense as a matter of 
innovation policy under a variety of circumstances.  Under a broader view 
of the goal of TRIPS as promoting innovation (rather than IP protection per 
se), exceptions should not only be tolerated but should be promoted under 
certain circumstances.   
WIPO is well-placed to provide a forum for analyzing exceptions that 
might potentially be implemented in national legislation.  A well-reasoned 
WIPO analysis would provide persuasive evidence to WTO bodies of how 
a large number of member states view the TRIPS provisions and also of 
the views of an organization with expertise in the area of innovation 
policy. 
If WIPO begins to take a greater role in TRIPS interpretation, it will be 
important to deal with traditional administrative issues of transparency, 
legitimacy, and voice.250  WIPO consideration of potential exceptions 
should incorporate the views not only of IP stakeholders, developing 
countries, and potential consumers of new inventions, but also of 
participants in and advocates for less traditional innovative practices, 
including the user innovation and open and collaborative innovation 
discussed in earlier parts of this Article.  Historically, WIPO has been very 
unwilling to permit participation from diverse constituencies.251  However, 
its experience with the Development Agenda and, as Debora J. Halbert 
argues, with the issue of traditional knowledge appears to be opening it up 
to more expansive participation.252   
Openness to input from innovators will be critical to the success of an 
Innovation Policy Agenda.  Once one acknowledges the importance of new 
and evolving models of innovation, it becomes essential to combine the IP 
and innovation policy expertise of an organization like the re-imagined 
WIPO with a means of tapping into the global innovation grassroots.  An 
                                                                                                                          
250 For general discussions of these issues in the global context, see, for example, Burris et al., 
supra note 11, at 54–57 (discussing administrative issues in seeking to use nodal forms of governance); 
Cassese, Global Standards, supra note 11, at 112–13 (discussing the emergence of global rules 
addressed to states and how the two interact); Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State, supra 
note 11, at 694 (discussing the procedural issues that must be dealt with in the global context to ensure 
the protection of individuals and organizations); Esty, supra note 11, at 1537–42 (stating the challenges 
that arise in the international context for administrative law); Kingsbury et al., supra note 11, at 37–39 
(discussing procedural participation and transparency in global administrative law); Slaughter & 
Zaring, supra note 11, at 224–25 (discussing transgovernmental networks and their potential to 
facilitate cooperation on the international level); Stewart, supra note 11, at 69–73 (discussing the issues 
of control, accountability, participation and responsiveness regarding domestic and global 
administrative law). 
251 Halbert, supra note 13, at 271–76. 
252 Id. at 271–80. 
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ear to the ground complements IP expertise in informing a flexible and 
responsive global system.   
With this in mind, WIPO should open up its deliberations on a regular 
basis to representatives of those involved in user innovation and open and 
collaborative innovation, as it is doing with indigenous communities in its 
deliberations regarding traditional knowledge.253  Beyond a more inclusive 
approach to NGOs, WIPO should consider adopting an accessible and 
open “notice-and-comment” approach to potential TRIPS exceptions.254  
The same Internet technology which is responsible for the recent surge in 
new innovative practices provides a mechanism for implementing a truly 
global notice and comment procedure.255  WIPO conceivably could set up 
an online forum for proposing and discussing TRIPS exceptions.256  
Interested parties, including states, industry actors, NGOs, and even 
individuals could submit comments about specific proposals for 
exceptions, interpretations of the TRIPS non-discrimination requirement, 
and so forth.  To draw out serious and well thought proposals, each 
proposal might be required to include an “innovation impact 
assessment”—arguments as to why the proposed exception or 
interpretation would promote innovation.  Online rating or tagging systems 
could also be used to weed out spurious proposals and comments or to 
group similar comments.257   
An open notice and comment procedure would provide a means to 
solicit a variety of perspectives which could inform WIPO and give it 
access to the distributed expertise about innovation which is present at the 
global grassroots.  An open process of notice and comment might go far to 
alleviate the legitimacy problems with WTO reliance on WIPO 
interpretations raised by Dreyfuss.258  TRIPS provides that the TRIPS 
Council “may consult with and seek information from any source it deems 
appropriate” in conjunction with its monitoring responsibilities.259  The 
more transparently vetted WIPO interpretations of TRIPS are, the more 
appropriate it would seem to be to rely on them.  
Of course, as discussed in Part III, there are limits to the extent to 
                                                                                                                          
253 Id. at 276–80. 
254 See Kingsbury et al., supra note 11, at 35 (discussing the relatively new phenomenon of 
adoption of notice and comment procedures by international bodies). 
255 Of course, not all members of constituencies importantly affected by innovation policy would 
have direct access to such an online forum.  However, as internet access is becoming more and more 
widespread, civil society NGOs would certainly have access, and, in any event, any procedure using the 
Internet to permit direct involvement by citizens worldwide in commenting on innovation policy would 
be vastly more inclusive than anything going on at WIPO presently. 
256 This proposal is reminiscent of Noveck’s “Peer to Patent” approach to examination being 
tested at the USPTO, Noveck, Peer to Patent, supra note 35, at 143–51, or of Cynthia Ho’s proposal 
for a response to biopiracy and patent bioethics issues, Ho, supra note 35, at 532–40.  
257 E.g., Noveck, Peer to Patent, supra note 35, at 147–49. 
258 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26. 
259 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 68. 
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which the provisions of TRIPS—which were meant to cabin patentability 
exceptions—can be stretched to accommodate the needs of a changing 
innovation regime.260  The advantages of having ongoing input and 
proposals for how states might implement the TRIPS flexibilities in light 
of an evolving innovation environment would extend beyond providing 
more informed and well-thought-out interpretations of the current 
provisions of TRIPS.  Proposals rejected in the TRIPS/WIPO interpretive 
process that were accompanied by persuasive innovation impact 
assessments would generate suggestions and support for possible 
amendments to TRIPS in light of changing technology and practice.   
For example, as discussed in Part III, there may be circumstances in 
particular technological fields which would make a relatively broad 
exception to the exclusive right to use an invention socially beneficial even 
where it might not be sufficiently limited to comply with Article 30.261  An 
open interpretive forum would provide advocates of user innovation with 
an opportunity to make the case for amending TRIPS to permit use 
exemptions to nurture this innovative practice.   
The availability of such a global forum for discussion and evaluation 
of proposed TRIPS exceptions and flexibilities would also feed debates 
about exceptions at the national level, likely helping to give political 
legitimacy to advocates of more flexible national IP regimes. 
D.  Amending TRIPS to Give WIPO an Administrative Role   
While the adoption of an Innovation Policy Agenda at WIPO and the 
establishment of a WIPO forum for vetting TRIPS flexibilities would be 
steps in the right direction, such an ad hoc approach to TRIPS flexibilities 
may not be enough to make positive room for evolving innovation 
practices.  Because of the complexity and continuing evolution of the 
innovation environment, it is hard to escape the conclusion that this is an 
arena in which a more explicitly administrative regime is needed at the 
global level.262 
Here I propose a more far-reaching change than could be accomplished 
simply by having WTO dispute resolution bodies take WIPO analysis into 
account informally in evaluating TRIPS exceptions.  The proposal would 
be to amend the TRIPS agreement to shift more of the burden for assessing 
                                                                                                                          
260 See supra Part III.A (discussing the limitation of TRIPS for accommodating evolving forms of 
innovation). 
261 See supra text accompanying notes 193–94. 
262 As Dreyfuss notes, the general framework of WTO reliance on expert international 
organizations to provide standards is not new.  Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 26.  She also notes, 
however, that such an approach might be risky at the moment since WIPO’s institutional identity is in a 
period of upheaval.  Id. at 28.  Most likely a change of the sort I advocate here would have to follow a 
period of experience with more informal input from WIPO under the auspices of an Innovation Policy 
Agenda. 
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the innovative benefits of TRIPS exemptions or of differential treatment of 
different technologies to an explicitly recognized administrative process, 
which would not require the very difficult step of treaty amendment every 
time the innovative process evolves.263  To accomplish this, a general 
provision permitting exceptions “reasonably intended to promote 
innovation and not to restrain trade” would be substituted for Article 30.264  
The amendment should also clarify that Articles 27 and 28 are subject to 
such exceptions.  As an expert innovation policy agency, WIPO would be 
given the formal responsibility for vetting exceptions to see whether they 
are “reasonably intended to promote innovation and not to restrain 
trade.”265  WTO dispute resolution would then defer, at least to some 
degree, to WIPO’s evaluations.   
Contemplating a more formal role for WIPO in evaluating TRIPS 
flexibilities raises at least two important issues.  First, there is the question 
of the extent of deference WTO dispute resolution bodies should give to 
WIPO interpretations of the proposed “reasonably intended to promote 
innovation and not to restrain trade” requirement.266  Rather than give even 
a re-imagined WIPO final authority over the validity of TRIPS exceptions, 
there are several reasons to prefer an intermediate level of deference.  
While a re-imagined WIPO would have a broad mandate, including, 
importantly, the current Development Agenda, there are a number of other 
international organizations with portfolios that touch on innovation policy.  
It would be reasonable to permit parties involved in dispute resolution 
proceedings to bring arguments against WIPO’s interpretations based on 
the views of organizations with expertise in areas other than innovation 
that are related to a particular dispute.  Indeed, as noted by Dreyfuss, the 
WTO itself has a trade agenda which will not always align with the 
promotion of innovation.267  It is only reasonable to leave room for WTO 
                                                                                                                          
263 See Okediji, supra note 14, discussing the potential for WIPO to play the role of an expert 
agency.  Okediji concludes that the WTO is the more appropriate forum for IP norm-setting in the final 
instance.  The proposals here are not necessarily inconsistent with WTO dominance in final 
decisionmaking.  The important point is that WIPO is well placed to formulate and vet innovation 
policy proposals even through final decisionmaking power undoubtedly will be vested in the WTO 
because of its enforcement powers. 
264 Here I address only the patent provisions of TRIPS.  Similar changes to the other sections of 
TRIPS should also be considered. 
265 WIPO itself would have to be restructured to implement such a formal vetting process, an 
issue which I do not deal with here. 
266 Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have recently considered a similar issue in connection with their 
proposal for an Innovation Policy Agency in the United States.  Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, 
Innovation and Its Reform: A Regulatory Perspective, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).  
They propose an Innovation Policy Agency with a mandate to review regulations proposed by other 
executive agencies in light of their effects on innovation policy.  They argue that the Innovation Policy 
Agency should have the power to send a proposed regulation back for further review, but that the 
agency with substantive authority in a particular area should have the power to enact the regulation 
over IPA remand.  
267 Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 28.   
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dispute resolution panels to take specifically trade-focused rationales into 
account.   
Second, there are good reasons, particularly in the international context 
(where the legitimacy of an administrative approach may be questioned) to 
avoid focusing too much power in one particular international actor 
(indeed, this is part of the problem with the current configuration of 
TRIPS).  Giving more responsibility for interpreting TRIPS to a re-
imagined WIPO raises reasonable concerns about agency capture by 
powerful developed country interests.  These concerns are mitigated 
somewhat in the context of new paradigms of innovation (in contrast to the 
situation with respect to the Development Agenda, for example) because, 
as we have seen in the past few years in the disputes between the 
pharmaceutical industry and much of the information technology industry, 
the evolution of innovation paradigms can set even powerful developed 
country interests at odds with one another.  Nonetheless, it would be best 
to avoid concentrating too much power over innovation policy in any one 
organization so as to avoid creating an overly attractive target for capture.  
Dividing power facilitates the ability for weaker players to have influence 
through nodal governance and regime shifting.   
There is thus a need to balance the advantages of innovation policy 
expertise and a reliable institutional framework for vetting proposed 
exceptions against the disadvantages of concentrated power.  An 
intermediate level of deference, in which WTO dispute resolution panels 
are required to articulate specific reasons for rejecting any exception which 
has survived WIPO’s vetting procedure, might be appropriate.  If a panel 
were to reject WIPO’s determination as to whether a particular exception 
promotes innovation, the WTO Appellate Body would be empowered to 
reweigh the WIPO analysis against the panel’s reasoning.   
WIPO evaluation of proposed exceptions would provide states with a 
degree of certainty in enacting them even if the dispute resolution 
procedure retained its role as the finally binding interpreter.  Because 
formal disputes under the WTO are rare, and because WIPO’s analysis 
would be ongoing, WIPO’s interpretations would likely be very influential.  
This would be particularly true if WIPO evaluations paved the way for 
broad adoption of exceptions by states, which might then constitute 
“subsequent practice in the application of the treaty” under Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention and hence inform subsequent interpretations.268 
E.  International Governance and Private Ordering of Innovation 
A final role for a re-imagined WIPO under an Innovation Policy 
Agenda would be as an incubator of potential international initiatives 
                                                                                                                          
268 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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related to the ways in which innovation is structured and governed by 
licensing law, competition law, and so forth.  Such initiatives might range 
from offering model licensing regimes, to promulgating best practices and 
standards, to suggesting model national legislation concerning the 
governance of innovative collaborations (including, for example, patent 
pools and other limited commons constructions), through to proposing new 
international agreements about such issues as reach-through licensing.   
Of course, existing open and collaborative projects have already 
wrestled with the question of how to employ IP and licensing in 
cooperation with formal or informal organizational structure to provide a 
productive and sustainable innovation process.  They have also dealt with 
procedural issues raised by the need for decision-making within an often 
widely-dispersed and self-selecting group.  Most significant open source 
software projects, for example, have well-defined governance structures, 
usually vesting decision-making authority, at least with respect to what 
goes into the official version of the program, in those who started the 
project or have demonstrated technical skill.269   
The success of open source software is also attributable to the 
development of a standardized “platform” of legal technology to define 
and govern the resulting limited commons.270  This legal apparatus 
supervises the activities of a transnational network of private actors 
(primarily the technologists who actually develop the software) and also 
serves to mediate between the collaborative enterprise and the rest of 
society.  The legal apparatus consists of a family of IP licenses, based on 
specific principles, which govern both the iterative development of the 
software and its potential uses.271  
Over time, the open source software community has also developed 
governance institutions, including primarily the activities of the Open 
Source Initiative272 and the Free Software Foundation.273  These 
organizations certify licenses in accordance with agreed-upon principles, 
which differ somewhat.  The Free Software Foundation maintains the 
widely used copyleft GPL license, while the Open Source Initiative has 
certified a number of different licenses,274 and maintains trademark 
protection for the “Open Source Initiative Approved” moniker and for the 
initiative’s symbol.  Both organizations also engage in broader policy and 
                                                                                                                          
269 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37, at 88–89, 166–71, 186–89; Steven Weber, Patterns of 
Governance in Open Source, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0, at 361–72 (DiBona, Cooper & Stone eds., 2006). 
270 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 37, at 179–85 (discussing the role of open source licenses as de 
facto constitutions). 
271 Id. at 180. 
272 Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2008). 
273 Free Software Foundation, http://www.fsf.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2008). 
274 See, e.g., Dusollier, supra note 12, at 1398–1400 (discussing the “schism” between Free 
Software Foundation and Open Source Initiative). 
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advocacy activities. 
These organizations, though non-governmental, provide models of 
governance of a widely dispersed and transnational community of 
developers and users.  Perhaps even more than governments, they are 
sensitive to concerns of legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents, since 
the option of exit (known in the open source world as “forking”) is much 
more easily exercised in cyberspace.  These legitimacy concerns have 
given rise to procedures reminiscent of typical administrative law.275   For 
example, the most recent release of the GPL copyleft license raised a great 
deal of controversy.276  In an effort to manage this controversy, Richard 
Stallman, whose Free Software Foundation “blesses” the license, held an 
eighteen-month period of what was essentially public “notice and 
comment” rulemaking before releasing the finalized version.277 
While these governance mechanisms have been highly successful and 
may remain adequate, as these modes of innovation take on increasing 
economic and social importance, it also becomes more important to 
manage the boundaries between these projects and both the proprietary 
world and the public domain.  It is not necessarily clear that the 
technologists involved in the governance of open and collaborative 
projects will be sensitive to the possible external impacts of their practices.  
As legal and organizational models for open and collaborative innovation 
proliferate, it may become more important to have broader public input 
into the forms they take.  Since many of these collaborations are 
quintessentially transnational, these governance issues are unavoidably 
global despite their roots in local contract and licensing law.   
It is thus possible that international bodies such as WIPO will be called 
upon to play a role in helping to shape the landscape in which this private 
ordering takes place so that the governance of user innovation and open 
and collaboration innovation takes into account broader public values.  The 
same kinds of issues concerning the balance between harmonization and 
international diversity that arise in considering TRIPS exceptions are likely 
to arise in the governance of the products of open and collaborative 
innovation processes as well.  A re-imagined WIPO focused on broad-
based consideration of innovation policy would be alert to these issues. 
                                                                                                                          
275 Indeed, these procedures are to some extent a model and proof of concept for the Internet-
enabled global notice and comment procedure proposed above. 
276 E.g., Charles Babcock, The Controversy Over GPL 3, INFO. WEEK (Mar. 17, 2007), available 
at http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/linux/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=198001444& 
pgno=1&queryText=&isPrev=. 
277 See Free Software Foundation, http://gplv3.fsf.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2008), for press 
releases and archives of the process for debating the revised license. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
We stand at what is probably only the beginning of a flowering of new 
and emergent innovation practices facilitated by developments in 
communication technology.  Yet, we confront these evolving practices 
with a rigid and outdated international innovation policy regime.  The main 
message of this Article is that it is high time to consider seriously both how 
to accommodate the user innovation and open and collaborative innovation 
practices that are already with us, and how to avoid repeating the mistake 
of institutionalizing any particular approach to innovation in a difficult-to-
change international instrument.  In doing so, we must also meet the need 
for sufficient harmonization to allow us to reap the benefits of globally 
distributed and diverse innovative practices.   
In this Article, I suggest that we seek to deploy an administrative-type 
approach to cope with emerging innovation paradigms.  To that end, I 
propose that WIPO be re-imagined as a broad-based innovation policy 
organization, at a minimum through the development and adoption of an 
Innovation Policy Agenda, and perhaps eventually through amendment of 
TRIPS to permit WIPO to serve as an interpretive “agency” under a more 
formal administrative approach to IP law exceptions.  I also suggest that 
WIPO provide a forum for considering issues of licensing and competition 
law raised by the governance of collaborative innovation projects and their 
boundaries with proprietary models on the one hand and the public domain 
on the other.  Primarily, this Article seeks to encourage an expanded 
dialogue in global innovation policy which takes into account emerging 
innovation paradigms. 
